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Citizens United, States Divided:  
An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending 
DOUGLAS M. SPENCER AND ABBY K. WOOD* 
What effect has Citizens United v. FEC had on independent spending in 
American politics? Previous attempts to answer this question have focused solely 
on federal elections, where there is no baseline for comparing changes in spending 
behavior. We overcome this limitation by examining the effects of Citizens United 
as a natural experiment on the states. Before Citizens United, about half of the 
states banned corporate independent expenditures and thus were “treated” by the 
Supreme Court’s decision, which invalidated these state laws. We rely on recently 
released state-level data to compare spending in “treated” states to spending in the 
“control” states, which have never banned corporate or union independent 
expenditures. We find that, while independent expenditures increased in both 
treated and control states between 2006 and 2010, the increase was more than 
twice as large in the treated states, and nearly all of the new money was funneled 
through nonprofit organizations and political committees where weak disclosure 
laws and practices protected the anonymity of the spenders. Finally, we observe 
that the increase in spending after Citizens United was not the product of fewer, 
larger expenditures as many scholars and pundits predicted, and we note that 
people were just as likely to make smaller expenditures (less than $400) after 
Citizens United as they were before. This finding is particularly striking because it 
cuts against the conventional wisdom of spending behavior and also challenges the 
logic of those who disagree with the most controversial element of the Citizens 
United decision—the rejection of political equality as a valid state interest.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Citizens United v. FEC1 sparked a national 
conversation about campaign finance laws2 that included a multitude of predictions 
about the decision’s effect on political spending. Most of the commentary and 
related scholarship about the decision correctly anticipated that election-related 
spending would increase after Citizens United. Indeed, during the 2012 federal 
election cycle, independent spending related to all federal races exceeded $1 
billion, which was approximately three times more than spending in 2008 and 
approximately six times more than spending in 2004.3 Independent spending has, in 
fact, increased in every federal election cycle since 1996.4 Pundits and scholars 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. In the twenty-seven months following the decision, the Wall Street Journal, USA 
Today, and Washington Post ran a combined 787 stories that mentioned Citizens United (an 
average of one every three days per paper) while the New York Times ran an astonishing 
1100 stories mentioning Citizens United (an average of 1.3 articles per day). This count 
includes columns and opinion pieces but not blog posts. Numbers are based on the authors’ 
search of individual newspapers’ online archives. The numbers for all four newspapers are: 
    
 
 
Newspaper 
 
Number of articles 
about Citizens United 
 
New York Times   1100 
Washington Post     327 
USA Today     220 
Wall Street Journal    195 
 
 
 3. Independent spending includes electioneering communications, independent 
expenditures, and other noncandidate and nonparty communications. See Ctr. for Responsive 
Politics, Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php.  
 4. Id. 
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have sharply disagreed, however, whether the type of increased spending warrants 
caution and a legislative response.5 To date, the general focus of this disagreement 
has been on federal elections,6 which, as we discuss below, severely limits any 
causal inferences about the effect of Citizens United on spending. As with any 
analysis of federal-level behavior, there is no control group against which to 
compare changes in spending behavior before and after an event. As a result, it is 
very difficult to ascertain whether changes in political spending after Citizens 
United are attributable to changes in the law or to other factors. In this Article, we 
examine the effects of Citizens United as a natural experiment on the states. Before 
Citizens United, about half of the states banned corporate independent expenditures 
and thus were “treated” by the Supreme Court’s decision, which invalidated these 
state bans. By comparing spending in states affected by the decision to spending in 
states that were not affected by the decision, we provide the first systematic 
estimates of the effect of Citizens United on independent political spending. 
We begin in Part I by retracing the steps that led to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in January 2010. Originally a relatively trivial challenge about disclosure, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Compare, e.g., Fred Wertheimer, Supreme Court Decision in Citizens United Case 
is Disaster for American People and Dark Day for the Court, ACSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/15151 (“The decision will unleash unprecedented 
amounts of corporate ‘influence-seeking’ money on our elections and create unprecedented 
opportunities for corporate ‘influence-buying’ corruption.”), with Bradley A. Smith, ‘Pure 
Science Fiction,’ USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2010, at 8A (“[T]he various ‘doomsday’ scenarios 
being floated by critics of the decision, claiming that corporations will dominate American 
politics with billions of dollars in expenditures, are pure science fiction.”). 
  Other critical responses include Rick Hasen, Citizens United: What Happens Next?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rick
-hasen/icitizens-unitedi-what-ha_b_431696.html (lamenting the Supreme Court’s decision as 
“a very bad day for American democracy” and describing how none of the four most feasible 
legislative responses or a proposed constitutional amendment are likely to make any 
difference); Bob Kerrey, The Senator from Exxon-Mobil?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2010, 
10:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-kerrey/the-senator-from-exxon-mo_b
_431245.html (“With $85 billion in profits during the 2008 election, Exxon Mobil would 
have been able to fully fund over 65,000 winning campaigns for U.S. House or outspend 
every candidate by a factor of 90 to 1. That’s a scary proposition when you consider that the 
health of our planet is at stake.”). 
  Examples of arguments that Citizens United warrants no concern include Kenneth P. 
Doyle, Ban on Corporate, Union Campaign Money Swept Aside by 5-4 Supreme Court 
Decision, BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY & POLITICS REPORT, Jan. 21, 2010, (describing 
arguments on both sides and quoting Joseph Sandler that “the impact of the Supreme Court 
ruling would be ‘more marginal than cataclysmic’ to the current campaign finance system”); 
Ilya Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling on Hillary Movie Heralds Freer Speech for All of Us, 
CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 9:29 AM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/supreme
-court-ruling-on-hillary-movie-heralds-freer-speech-for-all-of-us/ (“Today’s ruling may well 
lead to more corporate and union election spending, but none of this money will go directly 
to candidates—so there is no possible corruption or even ‘appearance of corruption.’ It will 
go instead to spreading information about candidates and issues. Such increases in spending 
should be welcome because studies have shown that more spending—more political 
communication—leads to better-informed voters.”). 
 6. See supra note 5.  
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the case ultimately invalidated well-established laws at the federal level and in 
twenty states. The public backlash to the Court’s opinion was swift, and the 
response was generally negative. Barely one week after the decision was 
announced, President Obama argued in his State of the Union address that the 
opinion had “open[ed] the floodgates” for spending “without limit in our 
elections.”7 This Article is motivated by the President’s remarks and is organized 
around the simple empirical question of whether Citizens United actually “opened 
the floodgates” of independent spending. 
In Part II, we present our empirical findings. Using recently released data from a 
sample of eighteen states—the universe of states for which data on independent 
expenditures are currently available—we address three questions related to 
spending before and after Citizens United: (1) Has spending increased after the 
decision and, if so, by how much? (2) Has the distribution of spending shifted 
toward corporate and union expenditures? (3) Are spending increases 
disproportionately driven by large expenditures? Using a difference-in-differences 
model, we find that spending increased in every state but that the increase was 
twice as large in states that were affected by Citizens United relative to states that 
were not affected. We also observe that the large increase in spending is driven 
almost exclusively by section 501(c) nonprofit organizations and section 527 
political committees (so named because of the federal tax code under which they 
are organized). Information about the donors to these groups is unavailable, so we 
cannot empirically verify the extent to which corporations and unions backed these 
groups. We do find, however, that the spending increase in states that were affected 
by Citizens United is not driven by the largest expenditures (i.e. larger than 
$55,000); rather the effect is most pronounced in the center of the distribution 
(twentieth to seventieth percentile)—that is, expenditures ranging from $1,000 to 
about $40,000. This finding is particularly striking because it cuts against the 
conventional wisdom of spending behavior and raises questions about the states’ 
equality interest, generally framed as a problem of disproportionate spending by the 
wealthiest, which we do not observe. 
In Part III, we provide some context for our analysis and consider the 
implications of our findings. First, we note that independent expenditures represent 
a fraction of overall campaign dollars at both the state and federal level. Campaign 
finance is still dominated by direct contributions to candidates, and Citizens United 
did not change the rules governing contributions. Second, we discuss the 
disconnect between the political system that the Supreme Court envisions and the 
political system that actually exists. As more and more political spending goes 
underground—26% of all outside federal spending in 2010 was by groups that do 
not disclose their donors—it becomes increasingly difficult to measure the effects 
of campaign finance laws on the political process. Finally, we discuss the Supreme 
Court’s decision to create a legal rule that defines away the risk of independent 
expenditures. In Citizens United, the Court admits that it does not care whether 
independent expenditures actually corrupt the political process because, in the 
Court’s view, independent expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of law, any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), in 156 CONG. 
REC. H414, H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010). 
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empirical evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. We strongly disagree with the 
Court’s reliance on this legal fiction. It is a blunt instrument for judging regulations 
of the political process. This is particularly true in cases that impact state campaign 
finance laws. The Court’s indifference to the empirical record, as well as its general 
aversion to as-applied challenges and its narrowing of acceptable evidence in 
campaign finance cases, is, in our view, both shortsighted and imprudent. 
I. CITIZENS UNITED 
A. Background 
The Supreme Court’s sweeping decision in Citizens United v. FEC culminated a 
controversial case that was initially motivated by a very modest challenge. Citizens 
United is perhaps best known for extending First Amendment protections to the 
political speech of corporations, yet the case had almost nothing to do with 
corporations or corporate identity. The opinion reaffirmed the proposition, first 
articulated in Buckley v. Valeo,8 that independent expenditures do not corrupt the 
political process.9 The initial complaint in Citizens United, however, was not about 
independent expenditures (which are made independent of the campaign and 
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate), nor was it about alleged corruption 
or appearance of corruption. The plaintiff, a conservative nonprofit advocacy 
organization called Citizens United, wanted to broadcast a series of television 
commercials to promote a new political documentary it had produced and did not 
want to disclose the donors who funded the film or the television advertisements.10 
In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)11 to 
regulate “sham issue ads,” which are advertisements that look like a public service 
announcement about a political or social issue but that are intended to persuade 
listeners to vote for or against a particular candidate. As part of BCRA, Congress 
coined a term—“electioneering communication”—to precisely define the kind of 
ads that would be subject to regulations under the new law. As defined in the Act, 
an electioneering communication is (1) a broadcast ad on television or radio that (2) 
refers to a federal candidate that (3) airs within thirty days of a primary election or 
sixty days of a general election and that (4) can reach an audience of 50,000 or 
more.12 This statutory creation was Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Buckley that any regulation of expenditures for ads that did not expressly 
advocate a candidate’s election or defeat risked being void for vagueness.13 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam) (“We find that the governmental interest in 
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify [FECA] 
§ 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures.”).  
9.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (“[W]e now conclude that 
independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). 
 10. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Citizens United v. 
FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-2240). 
 11. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 12. BCRA § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2006). 
 13. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. 
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Congress’s bright-line definition of electioneering communications responded 
directly to the Court’s concern about vagueness.14 Under BCRA, electioneering 
communications (i.e., clearly defined ads that do not expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate) were subject to several regulations, including, but 
not limited to: 
(1) Disclosure rules for identifying donors.15 
(2) A disclaimer requirement (e.g., “‘   is responsible 
for the content of this advertising.’”).16  
(3) A prohibition against corporations and unions from using 
general treasury funds to make electioneering 
communications.17 
As the 2008 presidential primary heated up, Citizens United produced a 
documentary film about Hillary Clinton as well as several television spots 
advertising the film.18 Citizens United understood that the television commercials it 
wanted to air met the statutory definition of electioneering communications: they 
would be broadcast on television, would refer to a federal candidate without 
expressly advocating her defeat, would air thirty days before the 2008 primary, and 
would reach 50,000 or more households.19 Furthermore, among Citizens United’s 
long list of donors that had contributed more than $1 million to fund the film and 
its advertisements were two for-profit corporations that contributed a combined 
amount of $2000 to the project.20 Although BCRA prohibited all electioneering 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 189–94 (2003). 
 15. BCRA § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006). 
 16. BCRA § 311(d)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2006). 
 17. BCRA § 203, 2. U.S.C. § 441(b) (2006).  
 18. Verified Complaint, supra note 10, at 2–7 (text of the advertisements presented in 
exhibit 1). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Citizens United reported that it collected $1 million for the production and 
distribution of the film. Brief for Appellant at 7, 33, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
(2010) (No. 08-205). Among its donors, Citizens United only refers to its “large donors,” or 
those that gave at least $1000 aggregate to Citizens United. See id. It is possible the amount 
of corporate money backing the film was higher, contributed in small amounts (less than 
$1000) by many corporations, though Citizens United only references the $2000 figure in its 
briefs. See id. 
  By accepting corporate contributions, Citizens United was not eligible for a 
“qualified nonprofit” exemption that the Court recognized in FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 
Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986). In order to qualify as an “MCFL corporation,” and thus 
be exempt from regulation by the FEC, a nonprofit must (1) “[be] formed for the express 
purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities” id. at 264; (2) 
“ha[ve] no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or 
earnings,” id.; and (3) not be “established by a business corporation or a labor union” or 
“accept contributions from such entities,” id. The Court’s reasoning for exempting MCFL 
organizations is that they pose no risk for corrupting the political process: “MCFL was 
formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has available are 
not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political 
marketplace.” Id. at 259; see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(a) (2012) (“set[ting] out the procedures 
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communications created with corporate general treasury dollars, the Supreme Court 
had carved out an exemption in a 2007 case, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(WRTL II).21 Wisconsin Right to Life was a conservative nonprofit advocacy 
organization that, like Citizens United, accepted contributions from corporations 
and wanted to run television and radio advertisements that met the statutory 
definition of electioneering communications.22 The organization urged listeners to 
contact their Senators and ask them to stop filibustering President Bush’s judicial 
nominees, but they did not urge listeners to vote against the Senators.23 Prior to 
2007, BCRA section 203 prohibited these advertisements from being broadcast 
because of the corporate dollars used to fund them. The Supreme Court had already 
upheld section 203 against a facial challenge in 2003,24 but the Court had held open 
the door for as-applied challenges, and Wisconsin Right to Life obliged in 2006.25 
The Supreme Court ultimately accepted Wisconsin Right to Life’s argument that 
the definition for electioneering communications was overbroad.26 In the Court’s 
opinion, a ban on corporate or union expenditures is constitutional (per Buckley) 
when the expenditures expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate.27 When there is no express advocacy, the constitutionality of a 
ban on corporate or union expenditures depends on whether a court interprets the 
expenditure as a “genuine” issue ad or as a “sham” issue ad.28 In the case of 
genuine issue ads, a ban would be unconstitutional. In the case of a sham issue ad 
(what the court referred to as an advertisement that is “the functional equivalent of” 
express advocacy), a ban on corporate or union expenditures would be 
constitutional.29 In WRTL II, the Court established a standard for determining 
                                                                                                                 
for demonstrating qualified nonprofit corporation status, for reporting independent 
expenditures and electioneering communications, and for disclosing the potential use of 
donations for political purposes.”). 
  In his Citizens United dissent, Justice Stevens argued that one possible (and 
narrower) solution to the case would have been “expand[ing] the MCFL exemption to cover 
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofits that accept only a de minimis amount of money from for-profit 
corporations. Citizens United professes to be such a group . . . .” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 21. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 22. See id. at 458–60.  
 23. See id. at 458–59. 
 24. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201–02 (2003). 
 25. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006) (per curiam) (“In 
upholding § 203 against a facial challenge [in McConnell], we did not purport to resolve 
future as-applied challenges.”). 
 26. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 471. 
 27. Id. at 469–70. 
 28. Id. at 474 (“[It] is not enough to establish that the ads can only reasonably be viewed 
as advocating or opposing a candidate in a federal election. . . . Discussion of issues cannot 
be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election. Where the First 
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”). 
 29. “Resolving [this case] requires us first to determine whether the speech at issue is 
the ‘functional equivalent’ of speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
candidate for federal office, or instead a ‘genuine issue a[d].’” Id. at 456 (citations omitted). 
“We further conclude that the interests held to justify restricting corporate campaign speech 
or its functional equivalent do not justify restricting issue advocacy . . . .” Id. at 457. 
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whether an advertisement is the functional equivalent of express advocacy: “only if 
the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote 
for or against a specific candidate.”30 In the case of Wisconsin Right to Life’s ads 
about the filibuster, the Court held that the ads “may reasonably be interpreted as 
something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate, . . . 
[so] they are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore fall 
outside the scope of McConnell’s holding.”31  
Citizens United believed, correctly, that its ads could reasonably be interpreted 
as something other than an appeal to vote against Hillary Clinton—namely, that 
they promoted a commercial product (the documentary film).32 Thus, Citizens 
United’s motion for preliminary injunction did not mention section 203 but took for 
granted that the ads could air under a WRTL II exemption. The goal of the 
preliminary injunction was to extend the WRTL II exemption to other provisions of 
BCRA, specifically sections 201 and 311.33 Section 201 would require Citizens 
United to disclose the “names and addresses of all contributors who contributed an 
aggregate amount of $1,000 or more.”34 Citizens United argued that this disclosure 
requirement would put its donors in a position to suffer retaliation by political 
opponents.35 Section 311 would require that each advertisement include a four-
second disclaimer that “[Citizens United] is responsible for the content of this 
advertising,” where the disclaimer appears in a “clearly readable manner” and 
“conveyed by an unobscured, full-screen view of a representative” from the 
sponsoring organization.36 Citizens United argued that four-second disclaimers 
would substantially distract from the message of its ten- and thirty-second ads.37 
Citizens United’s motion had clear, practical goals: get its advertisements on 
television without a costly four-second disclaimer and without the need to disclose 
the identity of donors, who presumably wanted to remain anonymous. However, it 
is clear that Citizens United had jurisprudential goals as well. As one of the original 
plaintiffs in the inaugural constitutional challenge to BCRA, Citizens United 
signaled that it did not agree with the trajectory of American campaign finance 
reform and that it was willing to take action to limit the effects of new regulations, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Id. at 469–70 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 476. 
 32. See Verified Complaint, supra note 10, at 4–6. 
 33. Citizens United’s original prayer for relief included the following:  
1. a declaratory judgment declaring BCRA §§ 201 and 311 unconstitutional 
as applied to (a) communications that may not be prohibited as electioneering 
communications under WRTL II and (b) Citizens United’s ads.  
2. a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the FEC from enforcing 
BCRA §§ 201 and 311 as applied to (a) communications that may not be 
prohibited as electioneering communications under WRTL II and (b) Citizens 
United’s ads.  
Id. at 10–11 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 34. BCRA § 201(f), 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006). 
 35. Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction Motion at 8, Citizens United v. 
FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-2240) [hereinafter PI Memo]. 
 36. BCRA § 311(d)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2006). 
 37. PI Memo, supra note 35, at 6. 
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specifically regulations that targeted expenditures.38 However grand its ambitions, 
Citizens United’s complaint was admittedly an incremental challenge that, at best, 
would chip away the scope of two provisions of a five-year-old law. A promising, 
though ultimately not very successful, business opportunity changed everything. 
On the same day that Citizens United filed its initial motion for preliminary 
injunction, a national media consortium offered Citizens United a four-month video 
on demand (VOD) contract that would make its documentary film available to 32 
million households nationwide for a fee of $1.2 million.39 With this offer on the 
table, the film itself became a potential electioneering communication. Citizens 
United recognized that the film, unlike the film’s advertisement, might not qualify 
for a WRTL II exemption. With repeated direct attacks on Hillary Clinton’s 
character and fitness for office, Citizens United feared that a court might interpret 
the film as the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Thus, Citizens United 
immediately amended its complaint to include an as-applied challenge to BCRA 
section 203, hoping a WRTL II exemption for the documentary film would permit 
its broadcast on demand.40 This amendment proved to be a harbinger of the case’s 
outcome. Though the VOD offer was never particularly lucrative,41 Citizens 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. In 2004, Citizens United formally submitted comments to the FEC in response to 
proposed changes to the definition of “expenditure,” strongly opposing “any changes to the 
Commission’s rules that would broaden the definition[] of ‘expenditure’ . . . to encompass 
activities that fall short of the express advocacy of the election or defeat of clearly identified 
Federal candidates.” Comments of Citizens United Regarding Proposed Changes to the 
Definitions of “Expenditure,” “Contribution” and “Political Committee,” FEC Notice 
2004-6, at 4 (Apr. 5, 2004), http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/political_comm_status/boss.pdf. 
 39. Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-2240). 
  The national conglomerate, National Cable Communications (NCC) Media, is an 
advertising and marketing agency that develops media plans for clients that want to advertise 
on television, cable, satellite, and online. The agency is “jointly owned by three of the 
nation’s largest cable system operators—Comcast, Cox Communications and Time Warner 
Cable—and represent[s] virtually every other TV service provider in the country.” Owners 
& Affiliates, NCC MEDIA, http://nccmedia.com/about/owners-affiliates. 
 40. See Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Citizens 
United, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (No. 07-2240-RCL). Citizens United’s legal strategy was 
almost entirely focused on WRTL II. Consider that WRTL II was invoked 134 times in 
Citizens United’s original thirty-eight-page motion for preliminary injunction (on average 
3.5 times per page), and sixty-six times in the sixteen-page amendment (on average 4.1 times 
per page). 
 41. In its first eight months, the Elections ’08 on-demand channel on which Hillary: The 
Movie would have aired, just 500,000 segments split between all of the available programs 
and ads had been viewed. Stephanie Clifford, Cable, Quietly, Introduces an Anytime 
Elections Channel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008, at C7. With more than eleven available ads 
and films on the Elections ’08 station, each would have been viewed (on average) by less 
than 50,000 people, thus falling short of the statutory requirement for definition as an 
electioneering communication. As reported in the New York Times, “[n]either traffic nor 
advertising on the election channel has been particularly strong.” Id. Citizens United offered 
a similar yet different explanation for why VOD failed to meet the statutory definition of 
electioneering communication: 
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United’s constitutional challenge of section 203 opened the gateway for the 
Supreme Court to significantly restrict BCRA’s reach, and to overturn twenty-two 
years of precedent in the process. 
B. In the Courts 
A three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia 
unanimously denied Citizens United’s motion for preliminary injunction.42 The 
district court determined that the documentary film was the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy because it “is susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform 
the electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the United States would 
be a dangerous place in a President Hillary Clinton world, and that viewers should 
vote against her.”43 Thus, the district court concluded that Citizens United did not 
have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.44 Pointing to an FEC 
advisory opinion in the footnotes, the court took for granted that VOD technology 
was covered by the definition of “electioneering communication.”45 Regarding the 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements, the district court agreed with Citizens 
United that the advertisements were not the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy but were merely electioneering communications.46 However, the court 
disagreed with Citizens United’s interpretation that WRTL II protects electioneering 
communications against any regulation.47 The district court did not believe that 
WRTL II went that far: “The only issue in [WRTL II] was whether speech that did 
not constitute the functional equivalent of express advocacy could be banned 
during the relevant pre-election period.”48 
                                                                                                                 
Because, unlike a broadcast, [VOD] is sent only to the requesting converter box 
(as opposed to a geographic area), a Video On Demand transmission will 
generally be viewed only by the members of the household who requested the 
Video On Demand program. Unless the recipient converter box is located in a 
sold-out football stadium, the transmission will not be able to be viewed by 
50,000 people. 
Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 27 n.2. 
 42. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 275. BCRA included a provision (section 403) 
that set forth a jurisdictional process where initial actions are heard by a three-judge panel of 
the District Court for the District of Columbia, and appeals are made directly to the Supreme 
Court. BCRA § 403, 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006). 
 43. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 279.  
 44. Id. at 278–80. 
 45. Id. at 277 n.6 (“The parties did not raise the issue of whether VOD was within the 
definition of ‘electioneering communication.’ However, a broadly worded FEC regulation 
defining ‘electioneering communications’ indicates that VOD would be a ‘broadcast, cable, 
or satellite communication’ because it is ‘disseminated through the facilities of a . . . cable 
television system.’ See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.29(b)(1), (b)(3)(i) (indicating that ‘broadcast, cable, 
or satellite communications’ include communications ‘aired, broadcast cablecast or 
otherwise disseminated through the facilities of a television station, radio station, cable 
television system, or satellite system’).” (omission in original)). But see supra note 41. 
 46. See Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 280–81. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 281 (emphasis added). 
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Citizens United appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.49 The parties subsequently filed 
cross motions for summary judgment,50 and the district court granted the FEC’s 
motion.51 Citizens United appealed once more.  
By the time the parties reached the Supreme Court for the second time, Citizens 
United had replaced its lead attorney with former Solicitor General Ted Olson. This 
personnel change immediately wrought changes to Citizens United’s arguments. 
Gone were the platitudes52 and the strict reliance on WRTL II.53 In their place were 
more direct challenges to the law and a more aggressive assault on the 
constitutionality of BCRA. Consider, for example, the first question presented in 
Olson’s brief: 
Whether the prohibition on corporate electioneering communications in 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) can 
constitutionally be applied to a feature-length documentary film about a 
political candidate funded almost exclusively through noncorporate 
donations and made available to digital cable subscribers through 
Video On Demand.54 
This question raised issues that had not yet been considered or fully fleshed out 
by either party or any court. For example, was section 203 systematically 
overbroad because it encompasses expenditures where corporate involvement is 
trivial? If so, perhaps the Court should reconsider a facial challenge to the law. Is 
there something special about VOD technology that makes it anomalous to section 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. Citizens United v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 1732 (2008) (mem). BCRA section 403(a)(3) 
states that a “final decision in the action shall be reviewable only by appeal directly to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.” 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006). The denial of a motion for 
preliminary injunction was not considered a final decision for purposes of appeal. 
 50. See Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion, Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 
(No. 07-2240); Defendant Federal Election Commission’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (No. 07-2240). 
 51. Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240 (ARR, RCL, RWR), 2008 WL 2788753 (Jul. 
18, 2008). 
 52. In each of his briefs, the original lead attorney James Bopp had framed his 
arguments around the idea that “campaign finance laws may only regulate communications 
that are ‘unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate.’” 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion at 1, Citizens United, 530 
F. Supp. 2d 274 (No. 07-2240) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976)). In his 
briefs for WRTL II a few years earlier, Bopp had rhetorically set the stakes as high as 
possible by introducing his argument with the following statement: 
The deep roots of this case lie not in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947, the Tillman Act of 1907, nor even the First Amendment, but in the 
struggle of the Anglo-American people to (a) establish themselves as sovereign 
and (b) curb the power of government officials to prevent the people from 
criticizing official actions. 
Brief for Appellee at 1, WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (Nos. 06-969 & 06-970). 
 53. See supra note 40. 
 54. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at i. 
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203? If so, perhaps the case can be resolved on narrow grounds. Olson also 
confronted Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce55 for the first time, the 
controlling precedent for corporate and union bans on independent expenditures 
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. Until Olson’s brief, 
both parties had taken corporate and union bans on express advocacy for granted. 
Olson, for his part, did not equivocate: “[Austin] was wrongly decided and should 
be overruled because it is flatly at odds with the well-established principle that First 
Amendment protection does not depend upon the identity of the speaker.”56 
These novel arguments were not lost on the FEC. Responding to the possibility 
of a facial challenge on section 203, the government pointed out that “[a]lthough 
appellant previously sought to have BCRA Section 203 declared facially 
unconstitutional, it later abandoned that claim, and the district court ultimately 
ordered dismissal of the relevant count pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.”57 
Regarding the petition to overturn Austin, the government argued that Citizens 
United had presented no basis for overruling Austin and, in any case, “[Citizens 
United’s] argument [was] not properly before the Court.”58 
Posturing aside, both parties understood that this was primarily a case about the 
definition and breadth of electioneering communications. Did the documentary film 
qualify for a WRTL II exemption as an electioneering communication? Do WRTL II 
exemptions extend to additional provisions of BCRA that regulate electioneering 
communications (e.g., disclosure and disclaimer requirements)? Both parties 
addressed these questions in great depth: in Olson’s thirty-seven-page brief, he 
refers to electioneering communications seventy-eight times; the government’s 
fifty-five-page brief has forty-six references to electioneering communications.59 
The primacy of electioneering communications in the case evaporated at oral 
argument in about one minute. In the space of sixty-two seconds, Deputy Solicitor 
General (DSG) Malcolm Stewart, responding to a query by Justice Alito, argued 
that regulations on electioneering communications would be constitutional, even 
beyond the statutory limitation of electioneering communications to broadcast, 
cable, and satellite communications.60 DSG Stewart suggested that the Constitution 
does not prohibit the government from banning corporate electioneering 
communications on other media, such as books, so long as the electioneering 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 56. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 13–14; see also id. at 30 (“Austin was wrongly 
decided and should be overruled.”). 
 57. Brief for the Appellee at 33, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 
08-205) (citation omitted). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 20; Brief for the Appellee, supra note 57. 
Compare these numbers to the number of references to independent expenditures or express 
advocacy: Citizens United’s brief mentioned independent expenditures ten times and express 
advocacy two times, while the government’s brief mentioned independent expenditures just 
nine times. This is worth noting, given that the eventual holding changed regulation of 
independent expenditures. As a reminder to the reader, independent expenditures advocate 
election or defeat of a candidate. Electioneering communications do not. 
 60. Oral Argument at 29:03–30:05, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_205.  
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communications were the functional equivalence of express advocacy.61 This idea 
elicited spirited responses from Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy, with Justice 
Alito pointing out that “most publishers are corporations.”62 In defense of his 
argument, DSG Stewart offered a reminder that proved key in broadening the scope 
of the ultimate decision. He said: “And it’s worth remembering that the preexisting 
Federal Election Campaign Act restrictions on corporate electioneering which have 
been limited by this Court’s decisions to express advocacy.”63 
This comment proved to be a key turning point in the case. On the last day of 
the 2009 term, the Court made a relatively rare announcement64 that it would rehear 
oral arguments specifically on the topic of corporate electioneering. The parties 
were directed to file supplemental briefs and address the following question: “For 
the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either or both Austin, 
and the part of McConnell, which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of 
[BCRA]?”65 
With that, the case took on an entirely new mandate. Instead of clarifying the 
relationship between BCRA and WRTL II, the Court announced that it would revisit 
more than twenty years of established campaign finance precedent. Both parties 
responded with force in their briefs. Scattered through its arguments, the 
government traced the long history of well-accepted regulations on the political 
behavior of corporations and unions, from the Tillman Act’s 1907 ban on direct 
contributions to candidates and Taft-Hartley’s 1947 ban on corporate and union 
independent expenditures, to the fact that twenty-two states passed bans on 
corporate independent expenditures throughout the twentieth century.66 Citizens 
United smelled blood. Twenty pages of the twenty-three-page brief were devoted to 
Austin, the bigger prize.67 Citizens United painted Austin as an outlier68 from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–30, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). 
 62. Id.at 27. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Between 1946 and 2010, the Supreme Court called for reargument in just 2.3% of its 
cases (172 of 8330). See Harold Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Ted Ruger, Jeffrey Segal, Andrew D. 
Martin & Sara Benesh, SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (we tabulated 
the number of cases in the subset of “Cases Organized by Supreme Court Citation” with an 
entry in the vector “dateRearg”). Despite this low number, many of the Supreme Court’s 
most famous cases, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), were decided after postponements for reargument. See Valerie 
Hoekstra & Timothy Johnson, Delaying Justice: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Hear 
Rearguments, 56 POL. RES. Q. 351, 351 (2003). 
 65. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (mem.) (citations omitted). 
 66. See Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 
08-205). 
 67. See Supplemental Brief for Appellant, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). 
 68. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 582 (2011). Hasen points to Chief Justice Robert’s opinion that portrays Citizens 
United as a doctrinally unifying opinion, restoring coherence to campaign finance law by 
invalidating the “outlier” Austin case. Id. at 583. Hasen argues that the decision merely 
created an illusion of coherence “because it is unlikely that the Court will follow [Citizens 
United] to its extreme—for example to allow spending by foreign nationals to influence 
candidate elections, to treat spending in judicial elections the same way as spending for other 
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trajectory of campaign finance jurisprudence that started in Buckley69 and spelled 
out the weaknesses inherent in the antidistortion and equality rationales that 
motivated Austin.70 
The longer Citizens United kept its case in front of the Court, the less the case 
resembled anything close to its initial complaint. Perhaps sensing this 
transfiguration during the oral reargument, Justice Sotomayor remarked, 
“[W]ouldn’t we be doing some more harm than good by a broad ruling in a case 
that doesn’t involve more business corporations and actually doesn’t even involve 
the traditional nonprofit organization?”71 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided a broad ruling would not do more harm 
than good. Pushing to the side more narrow constructions of constitutionality and 
statutory interpretation,72 the Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that Citizens United’s 
documentary film, though clearly the functional equivalent of express advocacy,73 
should be permitted to be broadcast on demand because the federal provision 
banning corporate and union independent expenditures on express advocacy (2 
U.S.C. § 441b) violated the First Amendment.74 Section 441b was a creature of the 
1974 amendments of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and had been 
specifically upheld against a constitutional challenge in Austin.75 Section 441b was 
amended by BCRA section 203 to include electioneering communications as well. 
The Court invalidated the entire section incorporating corporate and union bans on 
both electioneering communications and independent expenditures.76 
                                                                                                                 
races, or to strike down reasonable limits on campaign contributions made directly to 
candidates.” Id. at 585. 
 69. Supplemental Brief for Appellant, supra note 67, at 5, 10 (“Austin [w]as [a] [p]oorly 
[r]easoned [d]eparture [f]rom Buckley” and “Austin is simply a jurisprudential outlier.”).  
 70. See id. at 15–21. 
 71. Transcript of Rehearing Oral Argument at 34, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 
08-205). 
 72. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“First, the Court 
could have ruled, on statutory grounds, that a feature-length film distributed through video-
on-demand does not qualify as an ‘electioneering communication’ under § 203 of 
BCRA . . . . Second, the Court could have expanded the MCFL exemption to cover 
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofits that accept only a de minimis amount of money from for-profit 
corporations . . . . Finally, let us not forget Citizens United’s as-applied constitutional 
challenge.”). 
 73. Id. at 890 (majority opinion) (“Under [the functional-equivalent] test, Hillary is 
equivalent to express advocacy.”). 
 74. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. 
 75. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990). Before 
Austin, the Court had explicitly upheld the corporate ban on independent expenditures (i.e., 
electioneering that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate) in 2 U.S.C. 
§441(b) in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1976). In addition, the Court had implicitly 
upheld the corporate ban in several other cases. E.g., WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449 (2007); 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).  
 76. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14. Citizens United’s complaint against section 
203 (and later section 441b) concerned corporate funding directly and not unions. However, 
both section 203 more narrowly and section 441(b) more generally applied equally to 
corporations and unions. Because the Court did not distinguish corporations from unions but 
ruled the entirety of section 441(b) as unconstitutional, the holding applies to unions as well. 
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On the question of whether the WRTL II exemption extended beyond corporate 
and union spending bans (i.e., Citizens United’s original complaint), the Court 
answered in the negative. By a margin of 8–1, the Court upheld BCRA’s disclosure 
and disclaimer requirements as applied to any electioneering communication, 
whether the functional equivalent of express advocacy or not. 
C. The Aftermath 
The Supreme Court Justices had almost no idea what the practical implications 
of their decision would be. They understood very well the legal implications of 
overturning twenty years of precedent, and they could almost certainly predict how 
the political spin doctors would portray their decision. But it is unlikely that they 
understood the impact of their decision on incumbency rates, on the composition of 
candidate pools, on political participation, or on the behavior of corporations and 
unions. Commentators and scholars were quick to make their predictions.77 
Less than one week after the Citizens United decision was announced, President 
Barack Obama addressed the decision during his State of the Union. With six of the 
nine Justices sitting a few feet away, the President accused them of “revers[ing] a 
century of law that . . . w[ould] open the floodgates for special interests—including 
foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”78 He concluded his 
attack by arguing that American elections should not be “bankrolled by America’s 
most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. They should be decided by 
the American people.”79 These American people, as it turned out, were also 
disappointed by the decision. Less than three weeks after the ruling, 80% of 
respondents to a Washington Post/ABC News survey said they were opposed to the 
decision (with 65% expressing “strong” opposition).80 This negative opinion was 
shared by Democrats (85%), Republicans (76%), and Independents (81%) alike.81 
As recently as January 2012 (the two-year anniversary of Citizens United), the Pew 
Research Center reported that 65% of respondents to their nationwide poll who had 
heard about Citizens United said the opinion was having a negative impact on the 
2012 presidential election.82 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See supra note 5. 
 78. Obama, supra note 7, at H418. This statement elicited one of the great Freudian slips 
of all time in Congress. No sooner had President Obama finished his sentence that the Supreme 
Court had “open[ed] the floodgates for special interests . . . to spend without limit in our 
elections” than Congress began applauding and audibly cheering. Justice Alito was caught on 
camera during this applause muttering “simply not true.” For video of the exchange, see CBS 
Evening News with Katie Couric: Alito: ‘Simply Not True,’ (CBS television broadcast Jan. 28, 
2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6154907n. 
 79. Obama, supra note 7, at H418. 
 80. Jennifer Agiesta, Campaign Finance Ruling Sparks Bipartisan Agreement, WASH. 
POST POL. BLOG (Feb. 17, 2010, 11:12 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/behind-the
-numbers/post/campaign-finance-ruling-sparks-bipartisan-agreement/2010/12/20
/ABslgvF_blog.html. 
 81. Id. 
 82. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, SUPER PACS HAVING NEGATIVE 
IMPACT, SAY VOTERS AWARE OF ‘CITIZENS UNITED’ RULING 1 (2012), available at http://
www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/1-17-12%20Campaign%20Finance.pdf. 
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Perhaps the most notorious consequence of Citizens United was the emergence 
of “Super PACs,” or independent-expenditure-only “Political Action Committees” 
that are able to amass unlimited pots of money from corporations and unions (a 
direct result of Citizens United) as well as from individuals (via SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC, which adopted the rationale of Citizens United),83 and then spend unlimited 
amounts in support of or against candidates. Though Super PACs are prohibited 
from contributing directly to candidates or from even coordinating their 
expenditures with a campaign, five presidential candidates endorsed an “official” 
Super PAC,84 often run by their former staffers.85 As a result, Super PACs have 
become sidecars to each campaign’s motorcycle: ostensibly separate entities, but in 
essence comprising one vehicle.86 In addition, despite Citizens United’s green light 
for corporate and union spending, the bulk of Super PAC money has come from 
individuals,87 which creates the sense that Super PACs are merely conduits around 
individual contribution limits.88 
Perhaps more controversial, however, is the emergence of nonprofit political 
activism, specifically the increase in political spending by 501(c) organizations that 
do not have to disclose their donors. According to the Center for Responsive 
Politics, not a single dollar was spent by 501(c) organizations on independent 
expenditures or electioneering communications in the 2006 federal election cycle. 
During the 2010 election cycle (the first post–Citizens United election), 42% of all 
outside spending was made by 501(c) organizations.89 This is particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. Two months after Citizens United, the D.C. Court of Appeals invalidated various 
limits on individual contributions to independent expenditure groups, citing Citizens United, 
which, in the words of the court, “resolves this appeal” because “after Citizens United, 
independent expenditures do not implicate [quid pro quo corruption].” SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689, 693 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 84. The five candidates (and the Super PAC they endorsed) are: Mitt Romney (Restore 
Our Future), Barack Obama (Priorities USA Action), Newt Gingrich (Winning Our Future), 
Rick Perry (Make Us Great Again), and Jon Hunstman (Our Destiny PAC). See Ctr. for 
Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http:// 
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S. 
 85. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Debate Shows Super PACs’ Strength, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 
2012, 9:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71217.html (reporting that Mitt 
Romney admitted, with regards to the staff of his Super PAC, “‘of course they’re former 
staff of mine’ and ‘people who support me’”). 
 86. This metaphor originated from an unnamed GOP operative who predicted that 
“‘everybody will have [a Super PAC]—there will be a sidecar for every motorcycle.’” 
Melanie Mason, Jon Huntsman Latest Hopeful to Be Backed by ‘Super PAC,’ L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/30/news/la-pn-huntsman-super-pac
-20110830 (alteration in orginal).  
 87. According to an analysis of Super PAC filings by USA Today, “less than $1 out of 
every $5 flowing into super PACs’ coffers came from corporations.” Fredreka Schouten, 
Christopher Schnaars & Gregory Korte, Individuals, Not Corporations, Drive Super PAC 
Financing; But Critics Say Donors’ Goal to Buy Influence Is the Same, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 
2012, at A7. 
 88. For an in-depth overview of Super PACs, including their use and possible abuse, see 
generally Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012). 
 89. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05
/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html. 
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impressive considering that 501(c) groups are prohibited from engaging in political 
activity as a “substantial” part of its activities.90 
Interpreting all of these facts is quite complicated, despite the detail of available 
information and the clarity of comparisons across time. Proper evaluation requires 
an accurate expectation of the law’s effect ex ante. We draw our expectation from 
the history of modern campaign finance laws. 
D. Research Hypotheses 
Modern campaign finance laws are rooted in the Progressive Era of the early 
1900s and were part of a broad political reform movement to limit the power of 
corporate interests over state legislatures (e.g., railroad “robber barons” in 
California and “copper kings” in Montana91) and in Congress. In 1907, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Tillman Act, which prohibited corporations from making 
campaign contributions directly to political candidates, a prohibition that survives 
today.92 Though not explicitly articulated at the time, the Tillman Act raised four 
important constitutional questions that are still being debated today: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Exemption Requirements—Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS.GOV, http://
www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-
Section-501(c)(3)-Organizations (last reviewed or updated Sept. 3, 2013). In other words, 
when a donor gives to a 501(c), over half of that money cannot be used to support political 
activity. 
 91. See, e.g., MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN 
CAPITALISTS, 1861–1901, at 347–74 (1934); Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West: 
Citizens United, Caperton, and the War of the Copper Kings, 73 MONT. L. REV. 25 (2012); 
William P. Marshall, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Should 
Differences in a State’s Political History and Culture Matter?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 79, 81 
(2013). 
 92. 34 Stat. 864 (1907), 18 U.S.C. § 610. The federal ban on direct contributions by 
corporations was most recently validated by the Supreme Court in FEC v. Beaumont, 539 
U.S. 146 (2003). Several circuits have addressed the viability of corporate contribution bans 
since Citizens United and all have ruled that Beaumont is the controlling authority for the 
regulation of direct contributions to candidates. The Second Circuit upheld New York’s 
“pay-to-play” contribution limits. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“[The pay-to-play scheme] is similar to a [contribution] limit and subject to the less 
stringent standard of review . . . [and] is closely drawn to address a sufficiently important 
governmental interest.”). The Fourth Circuit overturned a lower court ruling that Citizens 
United rendered Beaumont moot. United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 615 (4th Cir. 
2012) (“Citizens United, a case that addresses corporate independent expenditures, does not 
undermine Beaumont’s reasoning.”). The Eighth Circuit unanimously upheld a state ban on 
direct contributions by corporations in Minnesota and specifically distinguished Citizens 
United by arguing that Beaumont is the controlling authority for the regulation of direct 
contributions to candidates. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 
864, 879 (8th Cir. 2012) (“In light of Beaumont, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the preliminary injunction.”). The Ninth Circuit also relied on Beaumont to 
uphold a city-level ban on corporate contributions in the same year. Thalheimer v. City of 
San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1124–26 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing three ways that Citizens 
United is distinct from Beaumont). 
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(1) To what extent may Congress ban (or regulate) the participation of 
individuals or groups in the political process? 
(2) What “state interests” justify an acceptable ban or regulation? 
(3) Are there different standards for evaluating regulations targeting 
individuals versus those targeting groups of individuals (e.g., 
unions and corporations)? 
(4) Are there different standards for evaluating regulations that target 
different types of groups of individuals (e.g., unions vs. PACs vs. 
nonprofits vs. corporations, etc.)? 
The Tillman Act singled out corporations as special creatures that warranted 
strict regulation because of the state’s compelling interest in curbing widespread 
and well-known corruption at the hands of large corporate contributors. Congress 
has since banned direct contributions by unions (in 1943)93 and foreign 
organizations (in 1966)94 based on a similar anticorruption interest.95 In the mid-
1940s, Congress treaded into the murky waters of independent expenditures. In 
1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act96 over the veto of President Harry 
Truman. This post–New Deal, antiunion law statutorily prohibited unions (and by 
extension corporations) from making any expenditures in connection with federal 
campaigns.97 Unlike the Tillman Act’s ban on direct campaign contributions, the 
regulation of independent expenditures has proven trickier for courts to interpret. 
This is due in large part to the state interests that courts have accepted as justifiable 
(and perhaps due in larger part to the state interests the courts have not accepted as 
justifiable).98 The Supreme Court has upheld the Tillman Act and other statutes 
regulating contributions to candidates on the basis that that they prevent corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.99 The Court’s logic is predicated on the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act, ch. 144, sec. 9, § 313, 57 Stat. 163, 167–6857 
Stat. 163 (1943). 
 94. See 1966 Amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 89-
486, 80 Stat. 244 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–618 (2006)). For a short history and 
discussion of the prohibition on foreign nationals (defined as individuals without “green cards,” 
individuals with foreign citizenship, foreign corporations, foreign governments, or foreign 
political parties), see Foreign Nationals, FEC.GOV (2003), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures
/foreign.shtml. 
 95. Note this section draws heavily from Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of 
Federal Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 16–20 
(Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005). 
 96. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. 
 97. Id. § 304; see also Note, Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of Restrictions on Union 
Political Activity, 57 Yale L.J. 806, 810 (1948) (“Second, Congress has supplemented its ban on 
‘contributions’ by adding the crucial term ‘expenditures.’”). 
 98. See infra Part III.B. 
 99. The clearest articulation of the Court's respect for preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (“Congress was justified in 
concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the 
opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be 
eliminated.”); id. at 33 (“Since the danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption apply 
with equal force to challengers and to incumbents, Congress had ample justification for imposing 
the same fundraising constraints upon both.”). 
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proposition that contributions to candidates may stimulate quid pro quo 
arrangements that violate fundamental principles of representative democracy.100 
Using this same logic, the Supreme Court has invalidated some limits on 
independent expenditures because, the Court reasons, independent expenditures 
are, by definition, independent of candidates and thus cannot give rise to quid pro 
quo corruption.101 It is this logic that motivated the Court to invalidate the ban on 
corporate independent expenditures in Citizens United. We draw the reader’s 
attention to the fact that the Court does not believe independent expenditures 
cannot corrupt, but that they do not corrupt as a matter of law.102 We address this 
tension in Part III below. In this Part, we note that while the logic of Citizens 
United has broad implications for campaign finance jurisprudence more generally, 
the scope of the decision is somewhat narrow. Our expectations for how Citizens 
United will impact spending behavior are driven by the fact that the decision was 
limited to the use of corporate or union general treasury funds to engage in political 
speech. We formulate our inquiry in the language of economics, where changes to 
campaign finance laws are interpreted as changes to individual demand curves, and 
the effect of the law is captured by the elasticity of demand for the relevant 
actors.103 In other words, we credit Citizens United with eliminating a major cost 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. See id. at 26–27 (“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political 
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of 
representative democracy is undermined.”). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“[T]he independent advocacy restricted by the [FECA] does not 
presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified 
with large campaign contributions.”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 
(2010) (noting that a lack of examples where votes were exchanged for expenditures “confirms 
Buckley’s reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, 
quid pro quo corruption”). The Citizens United Court continued, “[I]n fact, there is only scant 
evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate,” and “[i]ngratiation and access, in any 
event, are not corruption.” Finally, see SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
where the D.C. Circuit extended the holding of Citizens United to the case of individual 
contributions to independent expenditure-only groups by writing that  
the only interest we may evaluate to determine whether the government can justify 
contribution limits [to PACs] as applied to SpeechNow is the government’s 
anticorruption interest. Because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens 
United v. FEC, the analysis is straightforward. There, the Court held that the 
government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures. 
Id. at 692–93 (emphasis in original). Therefore, “contributions to groups that make only 
independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.” Id. at 694. 
  Not all observers agree with the Court. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, After Citizens 
United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 244 (2010) (calling this distinction “the greatest absurdity of 
campaign finance law—that independent expenditures pose no threat of campaign finance 
corruption.”). 
 102. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.  
 103. For a broad discussion of laws as transactions costs, see generally IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); JAMES M. 
BUCHANAN & ROGER D. CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT INTEREST (1998). 
  Cast as a public choice problem, all of the actors in the campaign finance 
ecosystem—incumbents, candidates, lobbyists, bundlers, donors, supporters, and 
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for firms. Before Citizens United, firms that wanted to make independent 
expenditures had to clear legal hurdles (e.g., setting up a PAC or giving to outside 
groups like 501(c) organizations) as well as practical hurdles (e.g., convincing 
employees to contribute). Citizens United eliminated that price for political 
participation. Assuming that no other election laws and regulations change, (which 
we know to be false—see Hypothesis 2b below) we would, as President Obama 
(and others) predicted, expect an increase in the amount of independent spending 
after this transaction cost has been removed. We articulate this expectation as a 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Citizens United “opened the floodgates” of independent 
expenditures generally.104 
More specifically, because the scope of Citizens United is limited to bans on 
corporate and union independent expenditures, we would expect to see an increase 
in the amount of independent expenditures made from the general treasuries of 
corporations and unions relative to other sources of independent expenditures. 
Naive hypothesis 2(a): Because Citizens United eliminated the 
transaction costs for corporations and unions, corporate/union 
independent expenditures will be larger as a share of all independent 
expenditures after Citizens United. 
As we point out above, nonprofit organizations that do not contribute funds 
directly to campaigns or coordinate their expenditures with a campaign (i.e., 501(c) 
and 527 groups) may solicit unlimited sums of money from corporations and 
unions, among other sources. Because 501(c) nonprofits are not required to disclose 
their donors, and because we might predict that corporations, like people, typically 
prefer to remain anonymous when spending money on political activities, we might 
expect the amount of independent expenditures made by nonprofit organizations to 
increase substantially after 2010.105 
                                                                                                                 
regulators—simultaneously pursue their own self-interest. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER 
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber & Anne 
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). This hypothesized premise led John Samples to argue against 
campaign finance “reform,” which he writes is code for “incumbency protection” inasmuch 
as no incumbent would vote for reform unless it benefited him or her. See JOHN C. SAMPLES, 
THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 233–54 (2006). 
 104. President Obama referred to an opening “floodgate.” Obama, supra note 7, at H418. 
This metaphor characterizes campaign finance laws as a blockage or barrier to political 
spending. Strict campaign finance laws are like dams, and when spending restrictions are 
lifted, the “floodgate theory” predicts that money will pour into political campaigns like 
flooding after a dam breaks.  
 105. Some scholars, expanding on the water metaphor of floodgates, have called this the 
hydraulic theory. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999); Raymond J. La Raja, Will 
Citizens United v. FEC Give More Political Power to Corporations? (Sept. 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=162175 (paper presented at the 2010 annual meeting of the American Political Science 
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Strategic hypothesis 2(b): Facing a lower price for political action 
after Citizens United, strategic corporations and unions will funnel 
their independent expenditures to nonprofit organizations that have 
weaker disclosure requirements. 
Finally, we explore the possibility that Citizens United had an effect on the 
distribution of individuals and groups of individuals that make independent 
expenditures. If it is true that Citizens United opened the floodgates to corporate 
and union spending in elections (whether via the general mechanism in Hypothesis 
1 or the more specific mechanism(s) in Hypothesis 2), and if it is true that 
corporations and unions spend large amounts of money on independent 
expenditures, then we might expect to see smaller spenders crowded out as the 
probability that their expenditure is pivotal shrinks. At some threshold, the cost of 
spending will outweigh the expected benefit and rational would-be spenders will 
opt out. 
Hypothesis 3: If Citizens United opened the floodgates to corporate 
and union spending, then small spenders, behaving rationally, will be 
less likely to participate after Citizens United. 
One major limitation on the ability to answer these questions comes from an 
almost universal focus by both academic and popular commentators on spending at 
the federal level. As with any analysis at the federal level, the lack of a control 
group makes causal inference extraordinarily difficult106: without a control group 
there is no counterfactual baseline against which to compare changes in spending 
patterns after Citizens United. We overcome this limitation by turning our attention 
to the states where two important features existed at the time of the Citizens United 
decision. First, about half of the states had an analogous ban on corporate 
independent expenditures and thus were treated by the decision that also 
invalidated their state laws. Second, nearly every state held a statewide election in 
2010. We treat Citizens United as a natural experiment on the states—an exogenous 
shock to half of the states’ laws. By measuring state-level spending over time, we 
are able to exploit the variation in campaign finance laws between states and better 
estimate the extent to which Citizens United, as opposed to other interventions or 
general time trends, is responsible for changes that we observe. 
                                                                                                                 
Association). According to this theory, targeted laws, such as a ban on independent 
expenditures, are analogous to large mallets in a carnival game of whack-a-mole. While the 
law may have a marginal effect on its target, this effect will be offset by increased spending 
elsewhere as money flows into campaigns one way or another. Id. at 9–10. As an example, a 
ban on direct contributions may lead to increased independent expenditures. Or a law that 
bans spending by corporations from their general treasuries may lead to increased spending 
by corporations via PACs, or earmarked (and anonymous) contributions to other nonprofit 
organizations.  
 106. At a minimum, a federal-only analysis is threatened by history and maturation 
effects. See Donald T. Campbell, Legal Reforms As Experiments, 23 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 217, 
220 (1970). 
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II. STATES DIVIDED 
In January 2010, twenty states prohibited corporations and/or unions from 
making independent expenditures to state campaigns.107 Although most of these 
bans were passed after the federal independent expenditure ban that the Court 
overturned in Citizens United, a handful of states had enacted bans earlier, 
including Wisconsin and West Virginia, which enacted bans in 1905 and 1908, 
respectively. A full chronology of state independent expenditure bans is found in 
Table 1. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his Citizens United dissent, all of these 
state laws were implicated by the Court’s holding,108 though none were implicated 
as clearly as Michigan’s. The dispute at the center of Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce109 was Michigan’s state independent expenditure ban. Thus, 
by overruling Austin, the Court directly invalidated Michigan’s ban, something the 
Michigan Secretary of State acknowledged one week later in a public statement.110 
By July 2010, eight more states had passed legislation that explicitly repealed their 
bans on corporate independent expenditures, and the chief campaign finance board 
or official in nine additional states had adopted an emergency rule or published an 
advisory opinion that Citizens United invalidated their state ban, which would go 
unenforced until the legislature acted.111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. These twenty states are, in alphabetical order, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Table 1. One additional state, New Hampshire, repealed 
its ban on corporate independent expenditures in 2000. 
 108. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 933 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a 
scalpel . . . [and] compounds the offense by implicitly striking down a great many state laws 
as well.”). 
 109. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 110. See Mich. Dep’t of State, Independent Expenditures by Corporations, Unions and 
Domestic Dependent Sovereigns U.S. Supreme Court Decision Issued January 21, 2010 
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan
.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1633_8723_15274-230880--,00.html. 
 111. Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and 
West Virginia passed legislation. Kentucky, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming lifted their bars by administrative action, including the decision 
not to enforce the bans. Administrative actions in Alaska and Oklahoma were later adopted 
into the states’ legislation. See Table A in the Appendix for a state-by-state breakdown of 
legal responses to Citizens United. 
2014] CITIZENS UNITED, STATES DIVIDED 337 
 
Table 1. State independent expenditure bans 
 
 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
Year ban  
took effect 
 
    
State 
 
 
Year ban 
took effect 
 
1. 
 
Wisconsin 
 
1905  
 
12. 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
1979 
2. West Virginia 1908  13. Texas 1987 
3. Montana 1947  14. Minnesota 1988 
4. Tennessee 1972  15. Alaska 1996 
5. North Carolina 1973  16. Connecticut 2000 
6. Kentucky 1974  17. Oklahoma 2000 
7. Massachusetts 1975  18. Colorado 2003 
8. Michigan 1976  19. Iowa 2003 
9. Wyoming 1977  20. Ohio 2005 
10. Arizona 1978  21. South Dakota 2007 
11. 
 
New Hampshire 
 
1979 
 
    
 
The fate of corporate independent expenditure bans in the two remaining states 
was not determined for several more months. The North Carolina legislature passed 
House Bill 748112 on July 10, 2010, striking the independent expenditure ban from 
its state code (among other things). Because North Carolina was subject to 
“preclearance” under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, however, the new law 
could not take effect until the Department of Justice approved the changes, which 
took nearly eight months.113 Montana’s independent expenditure ban hung in limbo 
for much longer, as the state defended its law against multiple legal challenges for 
two years. 
A. The Case of Montana 
Montana Attorney General Steve Bullock had originally led an effort to author 
an amicus brief in Citizens United on behalf of twenty-six Attorneys General that 
urged the Court to rule narrowly on just the federal issues and to either uphold or 
ignore Austin, as it represented the jurisprudential bedrock of many states’ 
regulations on corporate campaign spending.114 Less than two weeks after Citizens 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. H.B. 748, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2010). 
 113. North Carolina submitted three separate petitions for preclearance: 2010-3057, 
2010-3059, and 2010-3090. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Notice of Preclearance Activity: The 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, JUSTICE.GOV (Aug. 9, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/notices/vnote080910.php. The three preclearance submissions 
were approved on April 5, 2011. In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013), the Supreme Court invalidated section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which had 
subjected North Carolina to preclearance under section 5. Because the Department of Justice 
approved North Carolina’s campaign finance reform in 2010, Shelby County has no effect on 
these reforms. However, future reforms need not be precleared by the federal government.  
 114. See Brief of the States of Montana, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, as Amici 
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United was decided, Bullock appeared before the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules 
and Administration and lamented that he “didn’t want this fight in Montana, but the 
Citizens United decision will likely invite a challenge to the people’s law of 
1912.”115 It took just one month for that challenge to materialize. In March 2010, 
two corporations (later joined by a third) sued Bullock and asked the court to 
permanently enjoin him and all county attorneys from enforcing Montana’s 
corporate independent expenditure ban. Citing Citizens United, the trial court 
declared the state law unconstitutional, and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment.116 Quoting a U.S. district court judge who had held 
Minnesota’s corporate independent expenditure ban unconstitutional several 
months earlier,117 the trial court wrote that the “Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United is unequivocal: the government may not prohibit independent and 
indirect corporate expenditures on political speech.”118 The court concluded that 
Montana’s law “favors some speakers over corporations” and thus “abridges 
Plaintiffs’ right to engage in political speech . . . and is not narrowly tailored to 
meet any interest claimed to be compelling.”119 One year later, the parties argued 
their case on appeal before the Supreme Court of Montana. In a surprising decision, 
the supreme court reversed the lower court ruling that had, in the supreme court’s 
eyes, “erroneously construed and applied the Citizens United case.”120 After 
expressing skepticism that the plaintiff-appellees were at risk of any material harm, 
the court sought to distinguish the facts of the case by writing that “unlike Citizens 
United, this case concerns Montana law, Montana elections and it arises from 
Montana history.”121 The court noted that the burden of establishing a PAC was 
much less “onerous” in Montana than at the federal level (referencing one of the 
arguments by the Citizens United majority).122 The court also traced out the history 
                                                                                                                 
Curiae Addressing June 29, 2009 Order for Supplemental Briefing and Supporting Neither 
Party, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). 
 115. See Corporate America vs. the Voter: Examining the Supreme Court’s Decision to 
Allow Unlimited Corporate Spending in Elections Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 
111th Cong. 2 (2012), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files
.Serve&File_id=60a8bdb2-9112-47c9-a9d1-4be283039ac1 (statement of Steve Bullock, 
Att’y Gen. of Montana). 
 116. See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., No. BDV-2010-238, 2010 WL 4257195 
(Mont. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2010) (order on cross-motions for summary judgment). 
 117. See Minn. Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 
2010). The federal district court did not wait for the state legislature to act in ruling the law 
unconstitutional, even though the legislature was in conference on a repeal that it had 
debated for three months. The legislature ultimately passed Senate File 2471 one week after 
the district court opinion (though without reference to the opinion). See S.F. 2471, 86th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); see also SF 2471 Status in the Senate for the 86th Legislature 
(2009–2010), MINN. ST. LEGISLATURE, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/bill.php?b=Senate
&f=SF2471&ssn=0&y=2010. 
 118. W. Tradition P’ship, No. BDV-2010-238, slip op. at 12 (citation omitted) (quoting 
Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 873). 
 119. Id. at 9. 
 120. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 2011 MT 328, ¶ 10, 363 Mont. 220, 271 P.3d 
1, rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam). 
 121. Id. ¶ 16. 
 122. Id. ¶¶ 12, 21. 
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of serious corruption in Montana politics that had prompted the state to enact its 
Corrupt Practices Act in 1912.123 Finally, the Court homed in on the potential 
negative effects of corporate money in state judicial elections.124 Two justices 
dissented. Both expressed sincere sympathy with the majority’s opinion, yet felt 
constrained to follow what they saw as a clear application of a broad U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling.125 
On June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed Montana’s high 
court without a hearing.126 The Court’s statement was simple and clear: “There can 
be no serious doubt that [Citizens United applies to the Montana state law].”127 
Four Justices voted to deny the petition for writ of certiorari by American Tradition 
Partnership (as the corporation was now called), though they argued, in dissent, that 
Montana’s clear history of political corruption warranted an as-applied review of 
Citizens United.128 
The Montana case raises important questions about the relevance of empirical 
facts in American campaign finance jurisprudence. Taken together, Citizens United 
and American Tradition Partnership stand for the proposition that independent 
expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of law, any facts to the contrary 
notwithstanding. We take up the implications of this legal fiction in Part III below.  
B. Citizens United as a Natural Experiment 
As of June 25, 2012, corporations and unions were free to spend unlimited 
amounts of money from their general treasuries on independent expenditures for 
every election in every state. The exogenous shock of Citizens United on the laws 
of twenty states provides a natural setting to measure the effects of an independent 
expenditure ban on the spending behavior of corporations and unions. We do so by 
relying on recently compiled state-level reports of independent expenditures, which 
have been accumulated by the National Institute on Money in State Politics.129 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Id. ¶¶ 22–28. 
 124. Id. ¶¶ 111–17. Note that the U.S. Supreme Court had also worried about the 
negative effects of corporate money in judicial elections. Id.; see also Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 125. W. Tradition P’ship, 2011 MT 328, ¶ 69 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“I have never had 
to write a more frustrating dissent. I agree, at least in principle, with much of the Court’s 
discussion and with the arguments of the Attorney General. More to the point, I thoroughly 
disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. I agree, rather with the 
eloquent and, in my view, better-reasoned dissent of Justice Stevens. As a result, I find 
myself in the distasteful position of having to defend the applicability of a controlling 
precedent with which I profoundly disagree.”); id. ¶ 69 n.3 (“The task is all the more 
distasteful in light of Western Tradition Partnership’s questionable tactics and blatant 
hypocrisy.”); id. ¶ 49 (Baker, J., dissenting) (“[T]he State of Montana made no more 
compelling a case than that painstakingly presented in the 90-page dissenting opinion of 
Justice Stevens and emphatically rejected by the majority in Citizens United.”). 
 126. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).  
 127. Id. at 2491. 
 128. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 129. The National Institute on Money in State Politics is a nonpartisan, nonprofit 
organization in Helena, Montana, that maintains a “comprehensive and verifiable” database 
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Independent expenditure data are currently available for eighteen states between 
2006 and 2011—twelve states whose independent expenditure bans were 
invalidated by Citizens United (“treatment”) and six states that never had an 
independent expenditure ban (“control”). Our primary model, a difference-in-
differences design, compares spending related to all state races (gubernatorial, 
judicial, state legislative, and other statewide races) in treatment and control states 
between 2006 and 2010. This design requires us to drop two states from our sample 
for which there are available data: North Carolina (a treated state) because, as we 
describe above, the state’s repeal of its independent expenditure ban did not take 
effect until 2011, and Florida (a control state) because the only reported 
independent expenditures are on ballot measures, and corporate independent 
expenditures in support of or opposition to ballot measures has always been 
legal.130 For the remaining sixteen states in our sample, which comprise 48.9% of 
the population of the United States (see Figure 1 map on the next page), 
information is available about the name of each spender, the type of spender (e.g., 
union, party, nonprofit, etc.), the recipient of the expenditure, the target candidate, 
the targeted elected office, and the amount of each expenditure. 
Because Citizens United was decided three-quarters of the way into the 2010 
election cycle, and because state responses to the decision took effect even later in 
the year, we first test our assumption that treatment states in our sample were 
indeed “treated” in a meaningful way. For statewide seats with four-year terms, the 
2010 election cycle began on the day immediately following the 2006 gubernatorial 
election and was already three years old when the Supreme Court ruled in Citizens 
United.131 However, we note that almost all of the independent expenditures during 
the 2010 election cycle were made after every state in our sample had changed its 
law. In fact, 96.4% of all independent expenditures in our sample were made after 
the individual states passed laws removing their bans (and 100% of all independent 
expenditures in seven of the eleven treated states).132 We drop all expenditures that 
were made before the law changed in order to validly test the difference in 
spending in states with and without a prohibition on corporate independent 
expenditures. However, we note that the data are still vulnerable to various sources 
of confounding bias—factors that may jointly impact the likelihood that a state had 
imposed a spending ban and the level of independent expenditures. We include 
several variables in our models below to control for this bias. A summary of our 
covariates appears in the Appendix (Table C). 
Of the potential confounding variables that could impede our ability to show 
that Citizens United, and not something else, caused a change in independent 
expenditures in treatment states, one of the most important is the level of political 
competition in a given election year. Increased political competition could result in 
increased amounts of money going toward campaigns and election efforts, 
independent of the legal status on independent expenditures at the state level. We 
                                                                                                                 
of political spending in all fifty states, freely available to the public. Nat’l Inst. on Money in 
State Politics, Mission & History, FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG, http://followthemoney.org
/Institute/index.phtml. 
 130. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–91 (1978). 
 131. Similarly for seats up for election every two years, the 2010 election cycle was well 
underway when Citizens United was decided. 
 132. See Figure B in the Appendix. 
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measure political competition in four ways. First, as the difference between the 
proportion of Democrats and the proportion of Republicans in the upper and lower 
houses, lagged by one year.133 Second, whether the state government is divided 
(different parties control different branches of government) or unified. Third, as the 
number of seats that were closely contested in each house, meaning the winner 
received less than 55% of the vote. Fourth, as the lagged turnover in the upper and 
lower houses.134 
Finally, we include demographic information about each state’s population, 
including the percent of residents with a bachelor’s degree or more, the median 
income of residents, the percent of employees that are represented by unions, and 
the sum of all payrolls for firms with more than 100 employees. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. States’ corporate independent expenditure ban status at the time Citizens United 
was decided. Shaded states had a ban. Diagonal stripes represent the states included in our 
sample. Note that data for Florida and North Carolina are also available, though we exclude 
them from our sample. 
 
1. Overall Spending 
Our primary hypothesis is that overall independent spending will increase after 
Citizens United in states where a ban was lifted. We address this hypothesis using a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. The measure is |0.5 – (# Democrats in each house / size of house)|. 
 134. We build upon W. DEAN BURNHAM, PARTISAN DIVISION OF AMERICAN STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, 1834–1985 (ISCPR 00016) (1984), http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR00016.v1. 
Burnham’s study was updated in Stephen Ansolabehere, John Mark Hansen, Shigeo Hirano 
& James M. Snyder, Jr., More Democracy: The Direct Primary and Competition in U.S. 
Elections, 24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 190 (2010), and Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó & Jason 
Snyder, Political Dynasties, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (2009), and now by ourselves. 
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difference-in-differences model of independent expenditure spending over time, in 
which c represents each election cycle and L represents the law in each state with 
respect to independent expenditure bans for corporations or unions (= “ban” in 
treated states and = “no ban” otherwise). The difference-in-differences estimator, τ, 
can be written: 
τ =  {E[Yi | c = 2010, L = ban] – E[Yi | c = 2006, L = ban]} – 
  {E[Yi | c = 2010, L = no ban] – E[Yi | c = 2006, L = no ban]}. 
Or, in other words, the observed outcome is the difference between states before 
and after a ban among those that have a ban and states before and after a ban 
among states without a ban. In Figure 2, we plot the raw independent expenditures 
in treatment and control states before and after Citizens United. Because the 
number of states in the treatment and control conditions is not equal—eleven 
treatment and five control—we plot independent expenditures on a per capita basis, 
where there is more balance between the two groups (treated states comprise 28% 
of the U.S. population, control states 22%).135 In Figure 2, we see that when the 
corporate independent expenditure bans were still in effect, the level of independent 
expenditures was smaller, per capita, in states affected by the bans than in states 
that did not have a ban. In 2010, after the repeal of all state independent 
expenditure bans in the sample, the relationship changed: the level of independent 
expenditures in states whose bans had been repealed was higher per capita than the 
level of independent expenditures in control states. 
In a difference-in-differences design, the “treatment effect” is the difference 
between total independent expenditures in treated states and independent 
expenditures in a hypothetical counterfactual state that parallels the control states 
(marked with a dotted line in Figure 2). We address the limitations of this parallel 
time trends assumption below, but here note that the parallel counterfactual 
baseline provides context to the change that we observe in the treated states. If we 
just compared spending in treated states before and after Citizens United, we would 
overestimate the impact of the legal change. Conversely, if we just compared the 
difference in independent expenditures between treated and control states in 2010, 
we would underestimate the impact of the legal change. In real dollars, independent 
expenditures increased from $40 million to $72 million in our sample of states that 
had a corporate independent expenditure ban in 2006 (an increase of 80%). 
Independent expenditures increased from $38 million to $51 million in our sample 
of states that never had a corporate independent expenditure ban (an increase of 
34.2%). In other words, with an assumption of parallel time trends, we would have 
expected to see about 35% more spending in the treated states, whether or not they 
repealed their corporate bans on independent expenditures. 
With this information we can generate a more precise estimate of the change in 
spending attributable to changes in campaign finance law. This crucial information 
is missing for those who attempt to estimate the effect of Citizens United on federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. The average population between 2006 and 2010 was 82,343,434 in treated states and 
64,518,787 in control states. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html (last revised Dec. 20, 2012). 
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spending, though careful commentators who recognize this have offered theoretical 
counterfactuals to bolster their claims.136  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Difference-in-differences between per capita independent expenditures in 2006 
and 2010 and between states with a corporate independent expenditure ban and states 
without a ban. This approach assumes a parallel time trend between treated states and control 
states. The “treatment effect” or difference between spending in states in the treatment 
condition and the hypothetical counterfactual is 18.8 cents per person.  
 
Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics 2012. 
 
Based on raw spending numbers in our sample, of the $32 million increase in 
spending in treated states, $13 million is explained by the counterfactual trend. The 
remaining $19 million increase, or nineteen cents per person in Figure 2 (identified 
as the “treatment effect” or τ), can be attributed to external effects such as Citizens 
United, unique features of the states, or randomness. 
One of the limitations of the parallel time trends assumption is that all time-varying 
predictors of the outcome are considered to be equal in both control and treated states 
across the entire time period. We know this is not true in our sample; in fact, we know 
that our units of analysis (the states) vary in important ways that are related to the amount 
of independent expenditures we observe in treated (T) and control (C) states. For 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. See, e.g., Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., (July 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how
-much-has-citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that 
while, as of the time of the article, corporate independent expenditures had not skyrocketed 
in the wake of Citizens United, outside spending driven by “the fury and anxiety of out-of-
power millionaires” since BCRA had indeed skyrocketed and would have even without 
Citizens United). 
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example, some states experienced periods of divided government while others did not. In 
some states, for example, Colorado (T) and Ohio (T), the incumbent Governor was term-
limited in 2006. In other states, for example, Maine (C), Michigan (T), and Oklahoma 
(T), the incumbent Governor was term-limited in 2010. Some states in our sample are 
heavily populated, for example, Texas (T) and Ohio (T), and some are sparsely 
populated, for example, Alaska (T) and Maine (C). Some states are heavily Democratic, 
for example, California (C) and Massachusetts (T), and some are heavily Republican, for 
example, Idaho (C) and Tennessee (T). Some states have high rates of union 
membership, for example, Michigan (T) and Washington (C). In short, the states in our 
sample vary in many important respects that may be related to the amount of 
independent expenditures made in a particular election. The differences could undermine 
the assumption of parallel time trends between treatment and control states. Regression 
analysis is helpful for dealing with this problem. 
In Table 2, we present the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
estimating the difference between treated and control states, with and without a set of 
control variables. The outcome variable is the natural log of independent expenditures. 
When we control for state-level measures of political competition and demographics, the 
differences between the states in both the pre- and post-time periods shrink slightly, but 
the difference-in-differences estimator is exactly the same. In fact, the entire model with 
controls, though less precisely measured, is nearly identical to the model without 
controls.137 This suggests that the treatment effect (i.e., the difference in spending 
between treated states and a control-parallel counterfactual) is not being driven by 
confounders that we model, but by the treatment itself.138 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Other control variables we modeled include Democratic percentage of the state upper 
house (highly correlated with percentage in the lower house), lagged turnover in the upper 
house, the number of incumbents running, the number of seats in both houses, the size of 
legislative districts in both houses, the number of contested seats in both houses, divided 
government, the number of firms in the state, the payroll of all large firms, the percentage of the 
workforce that belongs to a union, and the percentage of the population with a B.A. or more. 
  Because our model includes so few observations (thirty-two state-years), we risk 
saturation by including too many variables in any one model. We ran multiple iterations of 
the difference-in-differences model 
log(independent expenditure)sy =αsy + β1(2010)y + β2(independent expenditure ban)s + 
       β3(2010*ban)sy + β4(controls)sy + εsy 
and the treatment effect was robust to every covariate that we included singly as well as 
nearly every combination of covariates (as the number of covariates exceeded five, the 
model became unstable). In these models, the interaction term fluctuated from as low as 1.14 
to as high as 1.35. 
 138. Our model is limited to observable and measurable covariates. This means that we 
cannot control for variation in state culture, unmeasured attitudes toward political spending, 
or other unobservable confounders. By assumption, these confounders are considered to be 
time-invariant. 
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Table 2. Logged independent expenditures in 2006 and 2010 
 
 (A) 
Without 
Controls 
 
(B) 
With 
Controls 
 
 
States with Bans –1.40 
 
–1.12 
 [–3.89, 0.71] [–3.74, 1.03] 
Post–Citizens United 0.36 –0.22 
 [–1.88, 2.37] [–2.17, 1.44] 
Bans * Post–Citizens United 1.28 1.27 
 [–1.36, 4.33] [–0.88, 3.93] 
N           32           32 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.34 
 
95% bootstrap confidence intervals in brackets (10,000 resamples) 
 
Note: One observation per state-year (N = 32). Model (A) represents a simple OLS 
interaction model with no control variables. In model (B) we include the following 
covariates: Democratic percentage of state lower house, number of contested seats in the 
current election, lagged turnover rates in lower house, state median income, and state 
population. Due to our low statistical power for this part of the analysis, these models are not 
statistically significant. 
 
These observed changes in overall spending implicate Citizens United but 
cannot tell the whole story. If Citizens United caused an increase in spending, then 
that increase would have been driven by corporate and union independent 
expenditures. In Figure 3, we plot spending by the known identity of the spender to 
see whether, as hypothesized above, we see an influx of corporate and union dollars 
after 2010. In theory, we should observe no change in levels of corporate/union 
spending in the control states across the entire time period and low (or no) levels of 
corporate/union spending in the treatment states in 2006, with convergence to 
control state levels in 2010. The data do not support this hypothesis.  
Corporate and union spending increased after Citizens United, but only in the 
control states.139 In addition, there is no convergence between treated and control 
states in 2010; treated states look less similar to the control states in 2010.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Union spending in the 2010 California gubernatorial race accounted for 62% of the 
increase in all control state spending between 2006 and 2010. Without California, union 
spending was $4 million higher in 2010. 
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Figure 3. Raw independent expenditures (IE), in millions of dollars, by spender. We exclude 
spending by individuals (three-tenths of 1% of spending) and spending categorized as 
“Other” (four-tenths of 1%) by the National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP). 
The largest category of spending is coded by the NIMSP as “Single Issue” and comprises 
spending by both 501(c) organizations and 527 political committees. 
 
We observe very little corporate spending. Among all of the control states, two 
corporations (Koch Industries in Washington and Energy Horizon Technologies in 
California) spent just over $1400 combined in 2010.140 Among all of the treated 
states, one corporation (Deloitte & Touche LLP in Texas) spent $3300 to cater a 
meal at an event supporting the state comptroller candidate in 2006,141 and one 
corporation (Lutak Lumber & Supply, Inc. in Alaska) spent $100 in 2010.142 
Unions spent far more than corporations, but the difference between 2006 and 2010 
in treated states was very small (4%).143 This is hardly a floodgate of spending by 
corporations and unions, as some pundits and scholars predicted. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Energy Horizon Technologies, 
FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/iespender
.phtml?ie=6828; Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Koch Industries, 
FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/iespender
.phtml?ie=9040. 
 141. Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Deloitte & Touche, FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG, 
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/iespender.phtml?ie=5242. This 
independent expenditure appears to have been made in violation of the corporate 
independent expenditure ban.  
 142. Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Lutak Lumber & Supply, Inc., 
FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/iespender
.phtml?ie=4631.  
 143. Note that Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Washington (all treated states) 
banned independent expenditures by corporations but not by unions. The $6.5 million of 
reported spending by unions in these states in 2006 was thus completely legal. Union 
expenditures in these four states increased by $300,000 (5%) in 2010. 
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We do observe one significant change in the treated states: spending by outside 
groups—both 501(c) nonprofit organizations and 527 political committees—nearly 
doubled both in terms of actual dollars ($25 million increase) and as a share of all 
spending (77% increase). Unfortunately, we do not know the source of 
contributions to these groups. Section 501(c) organizations are not required by law 
to disclose the identity of their donors, meaning we may never know who backed 
these groups. While 527 political committees are required to disclose their donors, 
the information is not easily accessible, requiring formal public-records requests in 
many states. 
One possible explanation for the observed divergence between treated and 
control states in 2010 is variation in political culture. In control states, tolerance for 
spending by unions and corporations is likely higher than in treated states. If states 
had corporate/union bans, particularly long-held bans, then the public’s perception 
that corporate/union money can corrupt politics might provide an extra incentive 
for corporations/unions in treated states to make independent expenditures through 
501(c) and 527 organizations, as we hypothesize above. In states that had no bans, 
this incentive may be much less powerful or nonexistent. 
In summary, in states affected by Citizens United, we observe a disproportionate 
increase in overall independent expenditures that is driven by 501(c) and 527 group 
spending. Although we cannot empirically verify that corporations and unions 
increased their political activity, we know that the most substantive changes to 
campaign finance laws between 2006 and 2010 eliminated prohibitions on 
corporate and union political spending, specifically on spending for the type of 
activities (independent expenditures) that are often managed by advocacy 
organizations and groups with political advertising expertise. In light of these facts, 
we view the findings in this Part as evidence that corporations and unions increased 
their political spending in response to laws that permitted them to do just that. This 
conclusion is neither surprising nor controversial. We note, moreover, that our 
analysis provides the first systematic estimates of the magnitude of the response—a 
100% spending increase—as well as the mechanism—an almost exclusive reliance 
on 501(c) and 527 organizations. 
2. Distributional Effects 
In addition to our analysis of aggregate spending above, we evaluate how the 
distribution of independent spending changed over time. Our interest in the 
distribution of spending is motivated by concerns about equality, a concern about 
which judges have shown mixed interest. In 1990, the Supreme Court recognized 
equality as a legitimate state interest when it upheld Michigan’s Campaign Finance 
Act.144 In Austin, the Supreme Court admitted concern about the “corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.”145 Although the idea of equality, or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990), 
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 145. Id. at 660. 
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what is sometimes referred to as “antidistortion,” has historically focused on the 
corporate form, the logic applies to noncorporate entities as well. To the extent that 
the wealthy spend large stockpiles of money in support of candidates, the Court 
recognized a state interest in preventing that money from distorting the public’s 
access to information or from distorting legislation and judicial decisions in favor 
of the spender.146 In Citizens United, the Court held that the antidistortion concern 
was not sufficiently compelling to justify limits on First Amendment speech.147 
One year later, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,148 
the Court’s majority explicitly rejected the antidistortion rationale altogether. 
 “Leveling the playing field” can sound like a good thing. But in a 
democracy, campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically 
important form of speech. The First Amendment embodies our choice 
as a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is 
freedom—the “unfettered interchange of ideas”—not whatever the 
State may view as fair.149 
The rejection of the antidistortion rationale has proven controversial, in large 
part because the Court itself has acknowledged that disproportionate spending may 
create bias in favor of the spender and violate the Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process.150 For several decades political scientists have reported high rates of 
political inequality—the affluent are politically active and the less advantaged are 
not—and policy outcomes that benefit those whose voices are heard.151 One 
hypothesis about the rise of overwhelmingly large expenditures is that it will drown 
out the voices of smaller donors, or crowd them out altogether. We cannot directly 
test this hypothesis because we cannot observe individuals or groups who 
contemplate making independent expenditures but ultimately decide not to. We 
can, however, test whether smaller spenders are more elastic to changes in 
campaign finance law, which may be instructive on this point. We test elasticity by 
analyzing the entire distribution of independent expenditures and comparing the 
relative share of large and small spenders per year. If smaller spenders are getting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. For example, the Court upheld an aggregate limit on contributions to candidates, 
political committees, and parties in Buckley. Note that at the time of this writing, the Court 
had agreed to hear a case challenging these aggregate limits. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 
893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), prob. juris. noted, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013). 
 147. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903–11. 
 148. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 149. Id. at 2826 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).  
 150. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263–64 (2009) (“We conclude 
that there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—
when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the 
judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”). 
 151. See generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE (2012); JACOB S. 
HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS (2010); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, 
SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE 
AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012); SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN 
SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY (1995). 
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crowded out, then we should observe a shift toward larger independent 
expenditures.152 
The distribution of all independent expenditures in our sample is shown in 
Figure 4. Because many spenders make repeated expenditures during one election, 
we aggregate spending to the level of the spender. The average (median) spender 
amount in 2006 and 2010 was $7545. Thirty-six spenders in the dataset (of 843 
total) spent $1 million or more in a state in a given year. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Logged amount spent by each unique spender in 2006 and 2010. Logged amounts 
are “translated” into dollar amounts in parenthesis. The data includes 843 reported spenders 
from sixteen states. Note that reported spenders are simply those that report independent 
expenditures pursuant to campaign finance requirements, and these reported spenders could 
all be spending money received by the same “root” spender or donor, which goes unreported. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. It is theoretically possible that individuals who get crowded out of the independent 
expenditure market choose to contribute money directly to candidates. In practice, however, 
independent expenditures are almost exclusively made by those who have already maxed out 
their direct contributions to candidates. See Briffault, supra note 88, at 1678. We provide a 
plot in Figure F in the Appendix of direct contributions to gubernatorial candidates before 
and after independent expenditure bans were passed in nineteen states, which suggests that 
there is no relationship between independent expenditure bans and direct contributions. 
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Our first statistical approach is to compare changes in spending between 
treatment and control states by percentile. We present quantile-quantile (QQ) plots 
for 2006 and 2010 in Figure 5. Control states are circles, treatment states are Xs, 
and the 45° line represents equal spending in 2006 and 2010. As Figure 6 
illustrates, there was very little change in the amount spent per spender in the 
control states in 2010 compared to 2006. The change in the treatment states was 
much more pronounced. Two two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, one on 
treatment and one on control, confirm that the difference is larger and more 
precisely measured among treatment states (D = 0.24, p-value = 0.00) than among 
control states (D = 0.07, p-value = 0.40).153 We also observe a slight downward 
departure from the line among treatment states at the lower percentiles, indicating 
that at least at some part of the distribution spending in 2006 was higher than in 
2010. The most prominent effect, however, is an increase in spending in treatment 
states after Citizens United in the middle of the distribution. We explore the 
robustness of this effect by running the same difference-in-differences analysis 
presented in the previous Part on every percentile in the data.154 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. By way of explanation, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests are simply an estimate of 
whether two distributions differ in a statistically significant way. Each group, treatment and 
control, present two distributions: before Citizens United and after. We test whether the 
group’s distribution in 2010 is different from its distribution in 2006. We are able to say it is 
for the treatment states. The change in the control states is smaller and less precisely 
estimated. We present two-sample K-S tests, though we think a one-sample test is justified 
since we are testing for crowding out. For a one-sample test, the estimates would be 
identical, but the p-values would be halved. 
 154. We estimate the equation  
Y = α + ß1 Post + ß2 Treatment + ß3 (Post * Treatment) + γ State + ε 
on each percentile of the data, where the coefficient of interest is ß3, and γ State is a state 
fixed effect, which controls for state-specific confounding. ß3 estimates the difference 
between two quantities: the pre-post difference among treated states and the pre-post 
difference among control states. Because we showed earlier that Citizens United seems to 
have had an effect on independent expenditure spending, we expect the former quantity 
(difference among treated states) to be greater than the latter quantity (difference across 
control states) across most of the distribution. Therefore, we expect to observe that most of 
the points in the data, each of which represents 1/100 of the distribution, will be above zero. 
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Figure 5. Quantile-quantile plots for treatment and control states between 2006 and 2010. 
Each dataset (treatment and control) are broken into 100 equally sized quantiles, or 
percentiles. Circles represent percentiles in control states and Xs represent percentiles in 
treatment states. The 45° line represents equal spending in 2006 and 2010. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates which parts of the distribution drive the differences between 
the states, helping us gain traction on the question of whether smaller spenders are 
affected differently than larger spenders. We observe that spending increased more 
in absolute dollar terms in the treated states than in the control states across nearly 
every percentile, with the most significant difference in the middle of the 
distribution and not the tails. In other words, the treatment effect that we identified 
in the previous Part is not driven by the largest expenditures.  
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Figure 6. Quantile regression (on 100 quantiles) by control and treated states, including state 
fixed effects. Each dot is the difference between spending in that percentile for 2010 and 
spending in that percentile for 2006 in both treatment and control states. The grey region is a 
95% confidence interval. 
 
Rather, the increase in post–Citizens United spending is the result of more 
independent expenditures in amounts between approximately $1000 (twentieth 
percentile) and $40,000 (seventieth percentile).155 We observe that spending in the 
lowest percentiles of the treated states is indistinguishable between 2006 and 2010, 
meaning that the smallest spenders were relatively inelastic to the changes in 
overall spending. Similarly, spending differences in the highest percentiles are 
indistinguishable from zero. These findings are particularly striking because they 
cut against the conventional wisdom of spending behavior and raise questions 
about the states’ equality interests, which presume significant activity in the “tails” 
of the spending distribution. The findings also challenge the characterization of 
political spending as an investment whose value increases with the probability that 
spending will be pivotal in securing a candidate’s victory. In this model, those who 
spend the very most and the very least are most elastic to changes in the law that 
regulate spending. Those who can afford to spend large amounts of money should 
positively respond to a law that permits unlimited expenditures, as each additional 
dollar increases the likelihood of playing a pivotal role. In response, those who 
spend the least—whose expenditures become relatively smaller and smaller—
withdraw from the game altogether. We do not observe this behavior. Instead, we 
see evidence, at least for expenditures in the lowest five percentiles (less than 
$420), that the decision to spend money on political advocacy might be modeled 
more precisely as an act of consumption. Participants seem to gain utility by the 
mere act of participation.156 No existing theory, nor any that we can conjure, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. A quantile plot for the difference-in-differences estimator is plotted in Figure D of 
the Appendix. 
 156. See Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., Why Is 
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predicts that this kind of consumptive behavior would be altered by a decision like 
Citizens United.  
What about the largest spenders? Is it possible that the “consumption value” 
theory explains the inelasticity of those who spend in the top third of the spending 
distribution? We are skeptical. First, though we acknowledge that the consumption 
value of political participation is subjective, we are not convinced that the value 
exceeds $40,000, which is the size of expenditures in the seventieth percentile. 
Second, we think it is more likely that the most sophisticated political operatives—
individuals and groups that, in our opinion, are also likely to spend the most money 
on political advocacy—find ways to influence the process in spite of regulations on 
different types of spending. In other words, it may be the case that the largest, most 
sophisticated spenders were already engaged in political advocacy at an efficient 
level. Removing the ban on corporate and union independent expenditures may 
have changed the way that independent expenditures are made and managed, but 
not the amount of independent expenditures overall. 
With regard to our statistical approach, we acknowledge two features that limit 
the inferences we are able make. The first is that we cannot distinguish between 
spenders. Thus, large spenders may be making one large expenditure or they may 
make several smaller expenditures. For example, suppose that Google wants to 
spend $1 million to support conservative candidates. After Citizens United, it can 
either make expenditures from its general treasury, which we could track, or it 
could give money to several other politically active groups, many of which would 
not disclose Google’s donation. Because we do not know the source of funds for 
the 501(c) and 527 organizations in our sample, we cannot distinguish between a 
world where Google gives its entire $1 million to a single organization and a world 
where Google gives $10,000 to each of 100 groups.157 This severely limits our 
interpretation of the quantile regression model. However, if corporations and 
unions are giving money to just one or two political advocacy groups or charities, 
then Figure 6 is suggestive that this corporate and union money did not overwhelm 
the entire distribution of expenditures. 
The second limitation of our model is that spending amounts are not weighted 
by their relative importance. Politics is more expensive in some states and less 
expensive in others. For example, all Arizona gubernatorial candidates combined 
spent $2.3 million in 2006. In that same year, gubernatorial candidates in California 
spent $12.9 million. In 2010, all candidates for state legislative office in Maine 
spent $3.3 million, while spending in California reached $102.4 million. Thus, a 
$50,000 independent expenditure during the 2006 Arizona gubernatorial election or 
the 2010 Maine state legislative election would have been far more important than 
the same amount given in California in those years. We investigate whether relative 
spending amounts change the interpretation by weighting each expenditure by the 
                                                                                                                 
There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 105, 125 (2003) 
(“It doesn’t seem accurate to view campaign contributions as a way of investing in political 
outcomes. Instead, aggregate campaign spending in the United States, we conjecture, mainly 
reflects the consumption value that individuals receive from giving to campaigns.”). 
 157. We think it is less likely for corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals to spread 
out their expenditures in this way, even for the benefit of anonymity; as with any principal-
agent relationship, every donation to an organization comes with a risk that the organization 
or charity will expropriate the funds for other purposes. 
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total amount of money in that state’s campaigns. Because legislative races—even 
aggregated—typically see much less money spent than gubernatorial races, we 
weight them separately.158 Each spender, then, is represented by the ratio of her 
expenditures to the total spending in that race. These “spender ratios” are very 
small percentages, ranging from 0.0000001 to 0.26. In the former case, the 
spender’s independent expenditures comprised one ten-millionth of the amount 
spent in the race. In the latter, the spender’s independent expenditures comprised 
over one-quarter of the amount spent in the race. The quantile regression of spender 
ratios (plot not presented) looks nearly identical to the model with raw spending 
numbers. Control states are uniform and indistinguishable from zero and treated 
states have a distinct hump in the middle of the distribution. 
We note that that there are only ninety-four spenders in the entire dataset that 
made independent expenditures in both 2006 and 2010 (7% of all spenders).159 We 
do not think this is evidence that independent expenditures are a one-shot game. 
Quite the contrary; as we describe in the previous Part, the independent expenditure 
market is largely driven by nonprofit organizations and political action committees. 
These groups notoriously enter and exit the market (e.g., “National Security PAC” 
in 1988, “Swift Vets and POWs for Truth” and “And For the Sake of the Kids” in 
2004, “American Crossroads” in 2012, etc.), while the administrators and donors 
behind the groups remain in the market for future elections. In other words, 
understanding the behavior of these groups is only the beginning. Without more 
robust disclosure laws, we are limited in the inferences that we can draw from these 
empirical findings. As we discuss in Part III, the current state of disclosure laws not 
only limits the information available for empirical analysis, but it is a sign that the 
Supreme Court did not fully understand how politics on the ground would play out 
in light of Citizens United.  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Independent Expenditures as Share of All Spending 
A full discussion of the implications of our findings requires some context. 
Independent expenditures have been the central focus of campaign finance news 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. There are two ways in which a spender’s ratio can change. The first is a change in 
the numerator (amount spent in a given state-year-election type) and the second is a change 
in the denominator (total amount spent in a given state-year-election type). Because we are 
interested in changes to the numerator, we weight each spender by the total amount of 
campaign spending—candidate spending and independent expenditures. We include 
candidate campaign spending because it is relatively predictable year-to-year than just 
independent expenditures. Therefore, the denominator changes very little across our sample. 
 159. We present a QQ plot in Appendix E showing the changes across the distribution of 
repeat treatment and repeat control spenders. It does not show an effect. However, we do not 
believe that our analysis should be the last word on repeat spenders in this context. As we 
discuss below, we are unable to observe those who spend in consecutive elections but do so 
under different organizational names each time. Our measure of repeat spenders does not tell 
the whole story about how the most sophisticated players respond to changes in the legal 
environment.  
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since the Citizens United decision. Indeed, in the two years since the decision, 
“Citizens United” has become a ubiquitous catchphrase for all of America's 
campaign finance ills, though it is just one of several deregulatory decisions under 
the Roberts Court.160 With all of this attention on independent expenditures, it 
might be easy to forget that independent expenditures represent just a fraction of 
overall campaign dollars. In the sixteen states that we analyze in this paper, nearly 
$140 million was spent independently in gubernatorial races between 2006 and 
2010. Direct contributions to gubernatorial candidates between 2006 and 2009 in 
those same states exceeded $1 billion, a ratio of more than $7 to $1 in favor of 
contributions.161 At the federal level the ratio is smaller but still dominated by 
direct contributions: $641 million of independent expenditures in the 2012 
presidential race compared to $1.4 billion contributed directly to the candidates, a 
ratio of more than $2 to $1.162 This relationship is often obscured by sloppy 
reporting in the media that glosses over important distinctions—contributions 
versus spending, spending by candidates versus spending by others, express 
advocacy versus issue advertisements, etc.—that determine whether, and the extent 
to which, regulations on political money are tolerable.163 
The logic of Citizens United is arguably very broad and has implications for 
contribution limits, the regulation of foreign money, and political equality in 
general. Indeed, much of the public backlash against the opinion stems from 
opposition to its logic and its signal that the Roberts Court is skeptical about 
campaign finance regulations more generally.164 The actual holding, however, is 
limited to bans (not limits) on corporations and unions making independent 
expenditures from their general treasuries.165 Despite media reports indicating 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn 
in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1065 (2008). 
 161. See Thad Beyle & Jennifer M. Jensen, Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures 
Database, UNC.EDU, http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/guber.html.  
 162. For IE data see Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG,http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012. 
For contributions information, see Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Presidential Race, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php.  
 163. See infra notes 166–68.  
 164. See Bill Allison, Yes, Virginia (and Dan and Wendy), Citizens United Opened the Door 
to Unlimited Money, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://sunlight
foundation.com/blog/2012/02/27/yes-virginia-and-dan-and-wendy-citizens-united-opened
-the-door-to-unlimited-money/ (“Citizens United, along with subsequent court decisions and 
FEC rulings stemming from it, has radically broadened the means available to well-heeled 
individuals, not to mention labor unions and corporations, to influence federal elections.”); 
Adam Skaggs, Thanks, Citizens United, for This Campaign Finance Mess We’re In, ATLANTIC, 
(July 27, 2012, 10:15 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/thanks
-citizens-united-for-this-campaign-finance-mess-were-in/260389/ (“[T]hose criticizing the 
critics of Citizens United miss the forest for the trees. Their myopic focus on debunking 
overstatements about the case downplays the major role Citizens United played in ushering 
in current conditions—and how it fits with the Roberts Court’s ongoing project to put our 
democracy up for auction.”).  
 165. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886, 896–99 (2010). 
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otherwise, Citizens United is not responsible for Sheldon Adelson,166 it did not 
prohibit corporate contributions to PACs,167 and it does not permit corporations and 
unions to directly contribute to candidates.168 There is no doubt that Citizens United 
has changed the campaign finance landscape in important ways—both the 
jurisprudence and the way that campaigns are actually run. There is little value in 
responding to exaggerated claims about Citizens United with claims that undersell 
its importance. The truth is that Citizens United is both a very narrow decision 
about corporate accounting practices and also the first case to significantly chip 
away at the underlying logic of Buckley v. Valeo that each individual voter should 
have an equal voice.169 With regard to the empirics, regardless of the political 
activity of corporations and unions, political candidate campaigns are still 
dominated by direct contributions, and Citizens United did not change the rules 
governing contributions. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Disclosure Disconnect 
One of the most overlooked aspects of the Citizens United decision was the 
nearly unanimous vote, 8–1, upholding the disclosure provisions of BCRA. The 
Court explained that “disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more 
comprehensive regulations of speech.”170 A few months after Citizens United, 
Justice Scalia articulated perhaps the Court’s strongest endorsement of disclosure 
on record when he opined that “[r]equiring people to stand up in public for their 
political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. . . . 
[Anonymous campaigning] does not resemble the Home of the Brave.”171 In light 
of this rhetoric it appears that the Supreme Court did not foresee that so much 
political spending would go underground. According to the Center for Responsive 
Politics, 0.2% of independent expenditures in 2006 were funded by 501(c) 
organizations (those groups that are not required to disclose their donors)172 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Eric Lipton, For Gingrich, a Rich Friend and a 
Big Lift, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, at A1 (Sheldon Adelson’s “last-minute interjection 
underscores how [Citizens United] has made it possible for a wealthy individual to influence 
an election.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Todd Ruger, ‘Citizen Conventions’ Should Respond to Citizens United, 
Harvard Law Professor Suggests, NAT’L L.J. (July 24, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj
/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202564279571&Citizen_conventions_should_respond_to_Citizens
_United_Harvard_law_professor_suggests# (subscription required) (“In Citizens United, the 
Court found that corporations and unions cannot be banned from making independent 
expenditures to political action committees or candidates.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Editorial, Confidence and the Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 
2012, at A19 (citing Citizens United, which “overturned an act of Congress limiting 
corporate and union campaign contributions.”). 
 169. For more, see generally Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010). 
 170. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. 
 171. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
This case addressed the disclosure of petition signatures for those opposed to same-sex 
marriage. Id. at 2813.  
 172. Section 501(c) organizations spent approximately $460,000 of $268 million in 
2014] CITIZENS UNITED, STATES DIVIDED 357 
 
compared to 20% in 2010.173 The disconnect between the political system the Court 
envisions and the political system that actually exists has transformed the judicial 
philosophy of “deregulate and disclose” into “cutback and conceal.” 
As a result, one of the most difficult challenges in judging campaign finance 
regulations is a lack of data. Lack of quality data prevents an evaluation of both 
assumptions underlying campaign finance laws and the effects of the laws and 
decisions that emerge based on those assumptions. Some opacity is by 
construction: many disclosure laws have a floor below which reporting is not 
required because the cost of disclosure outweighs the benefit of the information. 
Some opacity, however, is not by design but is rather the result of bureaucratic 
incompetence and poor data accessibility. In some cases, where publicly reported 
spending could offer valuable data, access issues pose a challenge for collection. 
For example, the independent spending data in this Article was collected by the 
National Institute on Money in State Politics, which reported data accessibility 
limitations in at least seventeen states.174 Many of those states were not included in 
our sample because the data were incomplete or inaccessible. Without data, statutes 
and judicial opinions are limited to justifications and conclusions based on 
anecdotes. This has important consequences. As Heather Gerken has argued, 
“[P]ure political compromise can be produced without coming to grips with the 
empirics; a sound decision cannot.”175 As we highlight above, we lack important 
information necessary to estimate the effect of Citizens United on the federal level 
because there is no counterfactual spending trend against which to compare 
observable changes in spending. Information exists at the state level, the subject of 
this Article, but the data are incomplete: we are limited to a subset of states in just a 
handful of years. Yet even with this limited data, we are able to estimate the 
magnitude of changes in independent spending and observe differences between 
states, expenditure types, and expenditure amounts. 
There are certainly many values that outweigh the benefits of evaluating and 
optimizing public policy. For example, anonymity is important for protecting the 
privacy, and therefore safety, of people who choose to donate to unpopular 
candidates or causes.176 We do not consider our advocacy of an empirically 
                                                                                                                 
outside spending in 2006. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2006 Outside Spending, by 
Group, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle
=2006&disp=O&type=I&chrt=D. 
 173. Section 501(c) organizations spent $77 million of $395 million in outside spending 
in 2010. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2010 Outside Spending, by Group, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG , http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php? cycle=2010
&chrt=D&disp=O&type=I. 
 174. E-mail from Denise Roth Barber, Managing Dir., Nat’l Inst. on Money in State 
Politics, to Douglas M. Spencer, Ph.D. Candidate, Univ. of Cal., Berkley (Mar. 8, 2011, 
6:31 PM) (on file with authors). Note that even after updating their data in 2012, the Institute 
described only twenty states as having “relatively robust disclosure”. Those states are 
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Kevin McNellis & Robin Parkinson, 
Independent Spending’s Role in State Elections, 2006–2010, FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG (Mar. 
15, 2012), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=481.  
 175. HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 40 (2009). 
 176. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 
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grounded campaign finance jurisprudence at odds with these values. We do believe 
that the government has a legitimate state interest in understanding the effects of 
campaign finance on the functioning of the democratic process, and this interest 
justifies stricter disclosure requirements than the status quo. Broad disclosure of all 
independent expenditures, regardless of the source, would enable researchers to 
better understand the role of money in politics: its effect on agenda setting, policy 
outcomes, recruitment of candidates, and even the quality of governance. This state 
interest of research is distinct from the traditional rationale for disclosure rules that 
informs the voter about who is funding individual candidates.177 The traditional 
“informational” rationale requires disclosure at a very fine-grained level, which 
implicates the First Amendment, raises important privacy concerns, and suffers 
from the problem of infinite regress: everybody gets their money from somebody 
else. Instead, we join the chorus of campaign finance reformers calling for 
aggregate “semi-disclosure.”178 As described by Richard Briffault, campaign 
finance reports should be used “more like Census data or income tax returns, with 
the focus for the most part not on the activities of specific individual donors and 
more on the behavior of demographic or economic aggregates.”179 By 
understanding the effect of various campaign finance regimes—and the states are 
currently good laboratories, with a variety of laws—legislative bodies and judges 
will be in a better position to set up rules that promote political participation, 
protect free speech, and ensure fair and equal opportunities for self-expression as 
necessary for our democratic republic. 
C. Political Equality: Legal Rules vs. Empirical Evidence 
The political equality rationale of Austin that the Court rejected in Citizens 
United was intimately tied to corporate identity. The compelling governmental 
interest in Austin was to prevent “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form . . . .”180 The Court in Austin distinguished corporations from wealthy 
individuals by virtue of the “special advantages” available only to corporations 
“such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the 
                                                                                                                 
98–101 (1982) (holding that the members of the Socialist Workers Party, a minority party 
whose members had a history of harassment by the government and private parties, were 
exempt from reporting requirements in Ohio that required the name and address of campaign 
contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements). 
 177. See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information 
Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1858–60 (2013) (“[The] government has an interest in 
helping voters to align their political preferences with their votes, and disclosure furthers that 
goal. In short, disclosure helps voters to vote more competently.” (footnote omitted)). 
 178. See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273 
(2010); Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75 (2010); Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-
Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11
/08/bruce-cain/shade-glare-case-semi-disclosure. 
 179. Briffault, supra note 178, at 276. 
 180. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (emphasis 
added), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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accumulation and distribution of assets . . . .”181 In its supplemental brief on 
Citizens United the government argued that the “[u]se of corporate treasury funds 
for electoral advocacy is inherently likely to corrode the political system.”182 
The Court in Citizens United flatly rejected the distortion qua corporate 
dominance rationale in Austin183 as well as its broader implication “that the 
Government has an interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the outcome of elections.’”184 The Court warned that “it is a 
dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws to influence the voters’ 
choices”185 and concluded that “[t]he rule that political speech cannot be limited 
based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the First 
Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the 
speaker’s identity.”186 
Although the importance of political equality has fallen into disfavor as a 
jurisprudential theory, it remains a central tenet of democratic theory and a “time-
honored goal in American constitutional thought” according to Cass Sunstein, who 
articulated the political equality rationale in this way: 
People who are able to organize themselves in such a way as to spend 
large amounts of cash should not be able to influence politics more than 
people who are not similarly able. . . . Of course economic inequalities 
cannot be made altogether irrelevant for politics. But the link can be 
diminished between wealth or poverty on the one hand and political 
influence on the other. The “one person-one vote” rule exemplifies the 
commitment to political equality. Limits on campaign expenditures are 
continuous with that rule.187 
This political equality rationale and its narrow articulation as corporate 
distortion are both predicated on empirical assumptions about the underlying 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. Id. at 658–59. 
 182. Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, supra note 66, at 6. Note that the government 
abandoned its reliance on the antidistortion rationale in its supplemental brief, despite 
favoring strict restrictions (including a ban on independent expenditures) on corporate 
political activity. For a discussion of the government’s strategy to orphan the antidistortion 
rationale, and the possible consequences of this strategy, see generally Richard L. Hasen, 
Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 
(2011). 
 183. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“Due consideration leads to this 
conclusion: Austin should be and now is overruled.” (citation omitted)).  
 184. Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)). 
 185. Id. at 904–05 (“‘Leveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing 
judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an 
election. The Constitution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the power to choose 
the Members of the House of Representatives, Art. I § 2, and it is a dangerous business for 
Congress to use the election laws to influence voters’ choices.’” (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 
U.S. 724, 742 (2008))). 
 186. Id. at 905. 
 187. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1390, 1392 (1994). 
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distribution of political spending and the behavior of corporations in the political 
marketplace. We test these assumptions in this Article and observe spending 
patterns that are not consistent with the distortion hypothesis at the state level, 
whether narrowly applied to corporate behavior or broadly defined as political 
inequality. Direct spending by corporations in the sample we analyze was very rare 
between 2006 and 2010, accounting for just $5800 of the $140 million spent on 
state races. And while it is almost certain that corporate dollars funded the 
independent expenditures of some advocacy groups, the relative significance of 
groups that spent more than $40,000 across the entire 2010 election cycle was no 
greater than these groups in 2006 when the law prohibited the use of corporate 
funds to finance their independent expenditures. In other words, even if all of the 
top 20% of spenders were corporations, or funded entirely by corporate money, 
there was no observable distortion brought about by Citizens United in treatment 
states; the size of independent expenditures by this group was the same in 2010 as 
in 2006.  
This finding has important implications for both campaign finance jurisprudence 
and legislative strategies that aim at political equality. If the election years in our 
sample are representative of larger trends, then spending, while skewed toward 
larger amounts, is relatively continuous. There are no big gaps in spending amounts 
between the “spenders” and the “big spenders.” More importantly, the spenders 
who were the most elastic to the removal of the corporate independent expenditure 
ban were not the largest spenders but those in the middle of the spending 
distributions (twentieth to seventieth percentiles of expenditures). It is quite 
possible that these same “middle spenders” are the most elastic to stricter campaign 
finance rules—a possible unintended consequence of laws targeting the largest 
expenditures. With respect to the Court’s view on distortion, Citizens United’s 
rejection of the political equality rationale may correctly reflect an underlying 
empirical distribution of spending that is continuous and not the victim of corporate 
distortion. (Our data do not speak to this directly as they are limited to state 
elections.) However, we note that the Court was not interested in the empirical 
distribution of spending; rather, it rejected the view that equality is a valid state 
interest with an ipse dixit that distortion is an unsuitable proxy for corruption.188 In 
the process, the Court created a legal rule to define away a problem that it later 
admitted was serious enough to warrant judicial intervention.189 In other words, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court proclaims 
that ‘Austin is undermined by experience since its announcement.’ This is a curious claim to 
make in a case that lacks a developed record. The majority has no empirical evidence with 
which to substantiate the claim; we just have its ipse dixit that the real world has not been 
kind to Austin. Nor does the majority bother to specify in what sense Austin has been 
‘undermined.’ Instead it treats the reader to a string of non sequiturs: ‘Our Nation's speech 
dynamic is changing’; ‘[s]peakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound bites, 
talking points, and scripted messages’; ‘[c]orporations . . . do not have monolithic views.’ 
How any of these ruminations weakens the force of stare decisis, escapes my 
comprehension.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)). 
 189. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2255, 2264–65 (2009) 
(ruling that half a million dollars in independent expenditures, combined with $2.5 million in 
donations to a section 527 organization and direct contributions of the statutory maximum 
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Court admitted that it did not care whether independent expenditures actually 
corrupt the political process because, in the Court’s eyes, independent expenditures 
cannot corrupt as a matter of law, any evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. 
We strongly disagree with the Court’s reliance on this legal fiction; it is the 
bluntest of all possible instruments for judging regulations of the political process. 
This is particularly true for cases that impact state campaign finance laws as 
Citizens United did. States have unique histories—unique from each other and 
unique from the federal experience—and each has a different set of laws passed at 
different times for different reasons. Indeed, when the state of Montana produced 
evidence of a long history of quid pro quo corruption to justify its state law, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the case without a hearing. The Court’s indifference to 
the empirical record in that case, as well as its general aversion to as-applied 
challenges and narrowing of acceptable evidence in campaign finance cases, is both 
shortsighted and imprudent. Although current disclosure laws prevent analysis of 
individual level data, even aggregate spending numbers lend themselves to insights 
that would significantly improve the jurisprudence on political spending if 
permitted. As it turns out, the empirical evidence presented in this Article seems to 
support the Court’s skepticism that corporate independent expenditures distort the 
political process in practice. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the end justifies 
the means in this case. Campaign finance statutes and jurisprudence relies heavily 
on assumptions about the effects of money on the political process. Many of these 
effects are empirically testable, but have not been tested. To the extent that judges 
sincerely care about preventing corruption and protecting First Amendment speech, 
they ought to rely on empirical evidence over arbitrary legal rules to determine 
whether the political process is actually corrupted and whether political speech has 
actually been chilled.  
A better understanding of the underlying distribution of spending and the 
elasticity of demand for political participation is central to the debate about the role 
of money in politics and the responsibility of governments to regulate the political 
process. This Article contributes to that understanding and in doing so joins a 
growing empirical literature that challenges some of the basic assumptions about 
campaign finance.190 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we retraced the steps that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United and systematically examined the effect of this decision on spending 
at the state level. We found that independent spending increased at twice the rate in 
states whose laws were affected by the decision. When we decomposed the sources 
                                                                                                                 
amount allowed all were enough to create a “a serious risk of actual bias” for the judge who 
benefitted from the spending and later hears a case in which the spender is a party). 
 190. See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 156, at 125 (“Much of the academic 
research and public discussion of campaign contributions appears to be starting from some 
misguided assumptions.”); see also Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of 
Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 122 (2004) (“[T]rends in general attitudes of corruption seem 
unrelated to anything happening in the campaign finance system (e.g., a rise in contributions 
or the introduction of a particular reform).”).  
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of independent expenditures, it did not initially appear that the predicted onslaught 
of independent spending by corporations materialized. However, we observed that 
spending by 501(c) and 527 organizations dramatically increased in the treated 
states, which we interpret as evidence of strategic behavior by firms to hide behind 
weak disclosure rules. Finally, we examined the distribution of independent 
expenditures before and after Citizens United. We did not observe spending 
patterns consistent with a distortion hypothesis. Instead, we found that increased 
spending in treated states was not driven by the largest expenditures (i.e., larger 
than $55,000); rather, the effect was most pronounced in the center of the 
distribution (twentieth to seventieth percentiles), with expenditures ranging from 
$1000 to about $40,000. We acknowledge as forthrightly as possible that the 
empirical analysis at the core of this Article can only tell part of the story. Any 
analysis of money in politics, specifically an empirical analysis, should also 
consider the broader institutional framework encompassing campaign finance 
regulations, of which Citizens United is only the most recent appendage. We have 
tried to do that here. 
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APPENDIX 
A. State Responses to Citizens United 
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Alaska 
Feb. 19, 2010 Y Y 
Sources 
1. Memorandum from Daniel S. Sullivan, Att’y Gen. of Alaska, to Mike
Nizich, Chief of Staff, Office of the Governor, State of Alaska (Feb. 
2010), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents
.asp?session=26&bill=SB284. 
 
2. S.B. 284, 26th Legs., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2010). 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Arizona 
Apr. 1, 2010 N Y 
Source 
H.B. 2788, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://
www.azleg.gov/DocumentsForBill.asp?Bill_Number=HB2788&Sessio
n_ID=93. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Colorado 
May 25, 2010 Y N 
Source 
S.B. 10-203, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010), available 
at http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2010A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3
/19FCBA5EBA4D531F872576DA006B4483?Open&file=203_01.pdf. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Connecticut 
June 8, 2010 Y N 
Source 
H.B. 5471, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2010), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType
=Bill&bill_num=5471&which_year=2010. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Iowa 
Apr. 8, 2010 N Y 
Source 
S.F. 2354, 83d Gen. Assemb., 2010 Sess. (Iowa 2010), available at 
http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=billinfo
&Service=Billbook&frame=1&GA=83&hbill=SF2354. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Kentucky 
Mar. 24, 2010 N N 
Source 
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, Advisory Opinion 2010-001, 
available at http://kref.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/99DD9B22-58DA-4AF2
-A641-9343CF7780E3/0/AO2010_001.pdf 
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 Date EC Ban Sample 
Massachusetts 
Feb. 8, 2010 N Y 
Source 
Mass. Office of Campaign & Political Fin., Statement by OCPF on 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, http://www.ocpf.net
/legaldoc/citizensunitedstatement.pdf. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Michigan 
Jan. 21, 2010 N Y 
Sources 
1. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), 
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 
2. Mich. Dep’t of State, Independent Expenditures by Corporations, 
Unions and Domestic Dependent Sovereigns U.S. Supreme Court 
Decision Issued January 21, 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7
-127-1633_8723_15274-230880--,00.html. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Minnesota 
May 18, 2010 N Y 
Sources 
1. Minn. Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. 
Minn. 2010) 
 
2. S.F. 2471, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010), available at https://
www.revisor.mn.gov/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=S
enate&f=SF2471&ssn=0&y=2010 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Montana 
June 25, 2012 N N 
Source 
Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per 
curiam). 
    
 Date effective EC Ban Sample 
North Carolina 
Apr. 5, 2011 Y N 
Sources 
1. H.B. 748, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2010), available at 
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Sessi
on=2009&BillID=h748. 
 
2. H.B. 748 was subject to preclearance (numbers 3057, 3059, and 
3090). 
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 Date EC Ban Sample 
Ohio 
Feb. 26, 2010 Y Y 
Source 
Jennifer Brunner, Mad About Citizens United? Yeah, It’s Bad, but We 
Can Do Something, DAILY KOS (Feb. 26, 2010, 6:58 AM), http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2010/02/26/840929/-Mad-about-Citizens
-United-Yeah-it-rsquo-s-Bad-but-We-Can-Do-Something. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Oklahoma 
Feb. 1, 2010 Y Y 
Source 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.74, § 257:10-1-7 (West Supp. 2014), available at 
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=10
0996. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Pennsylvania 
Mar. 4, 2010 N N 
Source 
Pa. Dep’t of State, Statement Regarding the Effect of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Citizens United v. FEC on Pennsylvania Law 
(March 4, 2010), http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway
/PTARGS_0_160329_772781_0_0_18/DOS%20Statement%20on%20
Citizens%20United%20Case%2003-10.pdf. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
South Dakota 
Mar. 11, 2010 N N 
Source  
H.R. 1053, 85th Legis. Assemb., 2010 Sess. (S.D. 2010), available at 
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2010/Bill.aspx?File=HB1053CNF.htm 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Tennessee 
June 23, 2010 N Y 
Source 
H.B. 3182, 106th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010), available at 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=HB3
182&ga=106. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Texas 
Apr. 21, 2010 N Y 
Sources 
1. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Ethics Advisory Op. No. 489 (Apr. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/opinions/489.html. 
 
2. H.B. 2359, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
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 Date EC Ban Sample 
West Virginia 
Mar. 13, 2010 N N 
Source  
H.B. 4647, 81st Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 2010), available at http://
www.legis.state.wv.us/bill_status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=HB4647%20S
UB%20ENR.htm&yr=2010&sesstype=RS&i=4647. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Wisconsin 
May 10, 2010 N N 
Source 
Press Release, Wisc. Gov’t Accountability Bd., G.A.B. Announces 
Emergency Rule on Independent Political Ads (May 20, 2010), 
available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/nr_gab
_emergency_rule_05_20_10_pdf_34804.pdf. 
    
 Date EC Ban Sample 
Wyoming 
Jan. 21, 2010 N N 
Source 
Robert M. Stern, Corporate Reform Coal., Sunlight State by State After 
Citizens United 34 (2012), available at http://www.citizen.org
/documents/sunlight-state-by-state-report.pdf. 
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B. State-Level Independent Expenditures During the 2010 Election Cycle 
 
 
Figure B. Independent expenditures during the 2010 election cycle. The vertical dashed line 
represents July 1, 2010, when every state in the sample had repealed its ban on corporate 
independent expenditures. In the “treated” states, 89.8% of all independent expenditures 
happened after July 1. This is a lower bound, since many of the states repealed their bans 
much earlier than July 1. Aggregated independent expenditures after the date of each 
individual state’s repeal accounted for 96.4% of all independent expenditures in the 2010 
election cycle (and 100% in seven of the eleven treated states). 
Control Treated
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C. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Min Max Mean 
Years 2006 2010 2008 
Total Spent 0 28,268,883 178,758.6 
Lower House Democrats 0.186 0.894 0.507 
Lower House Size 40 163 106.8 
Lower House District Size 8708 466,700 88,870 
Lower House Turnover 6 61 25 
Lower House Contested 26 147 73.61 
Upper House Democrats 0.200 0.875 0.494 
Upper House Size 20 67 39.33 
Upper House District Size 33,870 933,500 238,900 
Upper House Turnover 0 22 7.20 
Upper House Contested 2 65 19.81 
Gubernatorial Democrat 0 1 0.574 
Divided Government 0 1 0.5185 
Unified Government 0 1 0 
% with B.A. or Higher 21.7 38.2 26.97 
Median Income 39,940 65,520 51,470 
State Payroll of Firms 6,857,313 749,900,003 141,700,000 
% Unionized Employees 0.039 0.247 0.126 
State Population 677,300 37,340,000 9,004,000 
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D. Quantile Regression of Difference-in-Differences Model 
 
 
Figure D. Quantile difference-in-differences regression interaction term including state fixed 
effects. The [treatment–control] difference at every percentile is shown, comprising the 
[2010–2006] difference in log independent expenditures by spender state and year. The gray 
region is the 95% confidence interval. 
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E. Repeat Spenders 
 
 
Figure E. Quantile-quantile plots for “repeat players” in treatment and control states 
between 2006 and 2010. Circles are the QQplot for the control states (N = 51), and Xs are the 
QQplot for treatment states (N = 42). The diagonal line is where the points would be if 
spending in 2006 exactly equaled the spending in 2010 for a group. 
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F. Independent Expenditure Bans and Substitution Toward Direct Contributions 
 
 
 
Figure F. Direct campaign contributions to gubernatorial candidates in states that passed a 
ban on corporate/union independent expenditures.  
 
Source: Thad Beyle & Jennifer M. Jensen, Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures Database, 
UNC.EDU, http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/guber.html.  
 
Note: If there is a substitution away from independent expenditures in reaction to a ban, then 
we expect to see more contributions in years following a ban. In most states, only individuals 
are allowed to substitute in this way; corporations and unions are banned in twenty-three 
states from making direct contributions to candidates. See Life After Citizens United, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGS., http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/citizens-united-and
-the-states.aspx (updated Jan. 4, 2011). 
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DATA SOURCES 
Variable Source 
Independent 
expenditures 
Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG, 
http://followthemoney.org/Institute/index.phtml.
Legislative 
competition 
Updated from W. DEAN BURNHAM, PARTISAN DIVISION OF AMERICAN 
STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1834–1985 (ISCPR 00016) (1984),
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR00016.v1; Stephen Ansolabehere, John
Mark Hansen, Shigeo Hirano & James M. Snyder, Jr., More 
Democracy: The Direct Primary and Competition in U.S. Elections, 
24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 190 (2010); Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, 
& Jason Snyder, Political Dynasties, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 
(2009).
State population 
Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html (last 
revised Dec. 20, 2012). 
Legislative turnover 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, BOOK OF THE STATES tbl.3.4 (2006–
present), available at http://www.csg.org/policy/publications
/bookofthestates.aspx. Data before 2006 are not available online. 
Number of competitive 
legislative races 
Election returns reported on individual Secretaries of State 
websites. We identified races as “competitive” where the winner 
received less than 55% of the vote. 
Legislative district size 
2010 Constituents per State Legislative District Table, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state
-legislatures/2010-constituents-per-state-legislative-district.aspx.  
Earlier years calculated: number of seats/state population. 
Median income 
State Median Income, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/statemedian (last 
revised Sept. 19, 2013). 
Number of firms 
Statistics of U.S. Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/econ/susb/historical_data.html (last revised Apr. 
3, 2013). 
Firm payrolls 
Statistics of U.S. Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/econ/susb/historical_data.html (last revised Apr. 
3, 2013). 
Percent of employees 
represented by unions 
Data Retrieval: Labor Force Statistics, U.S. BUREAU LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpslutab5.htm 
(last revised June 21, 2007). 
Percent of population 
with B.A. or more 
Digest of Education Statistics, NAT’L CENTER EDUC STAT., 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/. The reported percentage is 
precisely estimated over time and we use the most recent measure 
reported for any given year. 
 
 
